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YEAR IN REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
by the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
The primary purpose of this review is to familiarize practitioners
with significant decisions handed down by these courts in 1993.
The summaries focus on the substantive areas of law addressed, the
statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of
each of the holdings. Space does not permit review of all cases
decided by the courts this year, but the authors have attempted to
highlight decisions signaling a departure from prior law or resolving
issues of first impression. Attorneys are advised not to rely upon
the information contained in this note without further reference to
the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims. The
cases have been divided into the following twelve areas of law:
administrative, business, constitutional, criminal, employment,
family, fish and game, native, procedure, property, tax and tort. In
some instances, these categories have been further subdivided into
more specific legal areas. The appendix lists the cases that were
omitted from this year's review. Generally, these cases were
omitted because they applied well-settled principles of law or
involved narrow holdings of limited import.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In 1993 the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of
Appeals decided a number of important administrative law cases.
These cases are grouped into three categories: land and the
environment, procedure and health care. In particular, the supreme
court upheld two challenges to the sale of oil and gas leases
because of insufficient impact determinations.
A. Land and the Environment
The Alaska Court of Appeals held in State v. Lowrence' that
the statutes which established the Kenai River Special Management
Area were not impermissibly vague.2 The court of appeals
Copyright © 1994 by Alaska Law Review
1. 858 P.2d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
2. This case came before the court of appeals because several defendants
convicted of violating park regulations challenged their convictions on the grounds
that the Kenai River Area was not a park at all. Id. at 636.
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concluded that the Kenai River Area is a state park and that
normal state park regulations are applicable to it.
This case involved issues of statutory interpretation that were
decided de novo by the court of appeals Under Alaska Statutes
section 41.21.504(a), the Kenai River Area "is assigned to the
Department of Natural Resources for control, maintenance and
development."4  Alaska Administrative Code title 11, section
12.340(11), defines a state park as "any land or water managed by
the division [of parks and outdoor recreation of the Department of
Natural Resources]."' The court of appeals concluded that, taken
together, the two provisions meant that the Kenai River Area is a
state park.
The court also relied heavily on legislative intent in dismissing
the defendant's assertion that state park regulations did not apply.7
The court was convinced that the "legislature intended the Kenai
River Area to be a state park and intended normal state park
regulations to govern the River Area."'
In Trustees for Alaska v. State Department of Natural Resourc-
es,9 the Alaska Supreme Court examined the sale of oil and gas
leases in Camden Bay to determine if they were consistent with the
standards of the Alaska Coastal Management Plan ("ACMP").0
The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") is responsible for
monitoring these sales to ensure that they comply with applicable
standards." The Trustees specifically contended that DNR's
determinations were without adequate support with respect to (1)
geophysical hazards, (2) historic, prehistoric and archeological
resources and (3) transportation and utilities.12
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed each of these arguments
in turn. First, in resolving the geophysical hazards issue, the court
noted two regulatory commands: (1) that "areas with known or
substantially possible geophysical hazards be identified," and (2)
that "development in such areas not be approved unless adequate
protective measures have been provided."13 The court rejected
3. Id.
4. ALASKA STAT. § 41.21.504(a) (1993).
5. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 12.340(11) (Jan. 1994).
6. Lowrence, 858 P.2d at 636-37.
7. Id. at 637.
8. Id. at 638.
9. 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993).
10. These standards are set forth in ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80.010(b)
(Jan. 1993).
11. Trustees, 851 P.2d at 1342.
12. Id. at 1342-43.
13. Id. at 1343.
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the Trustees' claim that DNR should undertake seismic studies to
identify special hazards prior to a sale.14
However, the court did conclude that "DNR's summary state-
ment that the entire.., area is a 'known geophysical hazard' does
not satisfy regulatory requirements."' 5 The effect of such a
classification is to defer decisions about geophysical hazards until
later stages in the development process. Such decisions would then
be made on a site-by-site basis. 6 The court noted that this
segmented assessment of environmental hazards created a greater
risk that DNR would approve environmentally unsound permits. 7
With respect to the Trustees' second argument, the one regard-
ing archeological resources, the court focused on the agency's
requirement to "identify areas of the coast which are important to
the study, understanding or illustration of national, state or local
history or prehistory."' 8 The court concluded that to comply with
the provision, DNR must, among other things, identify known
archeological sites at the initial sale stage. 9 However, DNR was
not required to conduct field studies at the initial sale stage to
determine whether any unknown archeological sites existed.'
Finally, with respect to the Trustees' third argument, the court
determined that there was no need to address the transportation
routes and utility sites issue.2' Companies generally do not
establish transportation routes and utility sites until and unless a
commercially exploitable discovery is made, so there is no need to
conform plans to ACMP regulations at the time of the sale of
leases.22
In Trustees for Alaska v. State Department of Natural Resourc-
es,23 seven environmental groups challenged the State's sale of Oil
and Gas Lease 55 ("Sale 55"), which permitted exploration and
development in the Beaufort Sea.24 The case arose after DNR
issued a finding in 1988 that the benefits of the sale outweighed its
possible adverse effects.' Specifically, the Trustees challenged
DNR's failure to consider the risks of transporting oil from the
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1343-44.
16. Id. at 1344.
17. Id.
18. ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80.150 (Jan. 1993).
19. Trustees, 851 P.2d at 1346.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 865 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1993).
24. Id. at 746.
25. Id. at 747.
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lease area, and the impact of oil operations on the Porcupine
Caribou herd and on subsistence users of this herd.26
The Alaska Supreme Court considered the transportation
question first, concluding that DNR "did not take a hard look at
the issue in making its best interest determination."'27 Specifically,
the court noted that no discussion occurred about the transporta-
tion of oil or what risks it would pose.' Likewise, the court
deemed inadequate DNR's findings as to the impact of develop-
ment on caribou.29 The court stated that the simple conclusion
that "offshore development cannot affect onshore caribou"3 did
not constitute a sufficient analysis."
In Earth Movers of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks North Star Bor-
ough,32 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed a third-party appeal
that contested an award of extraction rights.33 The superior court
had ruled that Earth Movers had no standing to challenge a
determination of the Department of Community Planning.:4
Earth Movers contended that it had standing because it would
suffer economically via increased commercial competition if the
extraction rights were granted. 5
In the area of land-use law, Alaska Statutes section 29.40.060
limits standing to persons "aggrieved" by a decision. 6 The
Borough, however, had an ordinance which granted standing to any
person "adversely affected,"'37 a standard which could have been
interpreted more broadly than "aggrievement." The Alaska
Supreme Court resolved this potential conflict by concluding that
in this context "adversely affected" had the same meaning as "ag-
grieved."38 The court also held that the "aggrievement" require-
ment is not met by the threat of potential business competition.39
The court reasoned that while Earth Movers may certainly have an
interest in being free from competition, that consideration is
26. Id.
27. Id. at 749.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 751.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Trustees for Alaska v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 795
P.2d 805, 809 (Alaska 1990)).
32. 865 P.2d 741 (Alaska 1993).
33. Id. at 742.
34. Id. at 745.
35. Id. at 745.
36. ALASKA STAT. § 29.40.060 (1992).
37. Earth Movers, 865 P.2d at 743.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 744.
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irrelevant in determining whether a party is "aggrieved" by a
zoning decision.'
In Stein v. Kelso,4 the Department of Environmental Conser-
vation ("DEC") appointed an independent deciding officer to
review the DEC's certification of certain permits issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").' In approving the
certification, the deciding officer limited the scope of the hearing
to two issues: (1) whether the DEC followed proper certification
procedures, and (2) whether the DEC properly determined that the
permits assured compliance with state water quality standards.43
Six placer miners appealed the deciding officer's findings, argu-
ing that the limited scope of the hearing deprived them of the
opportunity to pursue a takings claim.' The miners sought to
argue at the hearing that the permits set such stringent effluent
limits that they effectively deprived the miners of their property
without just compensation or due process of law.4'
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the miners' argument,
noting that under federal law the DEC could not legally adjust the
effluent standards contained in the permit to correspond with the
wishes of the miners.' Accordingly, the deciding officer had no
authority to order the DEC to do so.' Thus, it was within the
deciding officer's discretion to limit the scope of the hearing to
those issues on which he could actually provide relief."
The miners also challenged the decision to award attorney's
fees to the state. They claimed that they should have been deemed
public interest litigants not liable for attorney's fees.49 In Anchor-
age Daily News v. Anchorage School District,"0 the court listed
four requirements for status as a public interest litigant:
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong public policies?(2) If the plaintiff is successful, will many people benefit from
the lawsuit?
(3) Can only a private party have been expected to bring suit on
the issue?
40. Id. at 745.
41. 846 P.2d 123 (Alaska 1993).
42. Id. at 125.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 126.
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id at 126-27.
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 803 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1990).
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(4) Would the litigant have economic motive to bring suit even
if the action concerned only narrow issues which lacked general
importance?51
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the miners' claims did not
fall under any of the four categories, and, therefore, the relief
sought by the miners was personal, not public.5 2 Therefore, the
court upheld the award of attorney's fees to the state.5 3
B. Procedure
Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage54 involved a referendum
on an ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion in public employment. 5 the municipal clerk determined that
there was a sufficient number of signatures on the petition, certified
it and prepared a referendum proposition for the municipal election
which asked:
Should AO [Anchorage Ordinance] 92-116(S), which adds sexual
orientation to the list of protected classes for the purpose of
public employment or municipal contractors, remain law?56
Petitioners appealed the clerk's certification and sought a stay of
the election, so far as it pertained to the referendum. 7 On
appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court granted the stay. 8
The court decided two questions. First, the court looked at
whether the petition fairly and accurately described the ordinance
it sought to repeal59 and determined that it did not.' The court
then addressed the question of whether a referendum petition in an
election, conducted by the Municipality of Anchorage, is required
to fairly and accurately describe the ordinance it seeks to repeal.
The majority noted that misleading petitions in elections con-
ducted by the state were definitely not permitted.' However, for
home rule municipalities (such as Anchorage), there was no specific
requirement for impartiality.' Thus, the question was whether
Anchorage Ordinance section 2.50.030(A), mandating that an
51. Id. at 404.
52. Stein, 846 P.2d at 127.
53. Id.
54. 860 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1993).
55. Id. at 1215.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1216.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1217.
61. Id. at 1216.
62. Id. at 1218.
63. Id.
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ordinance be "described" in the petition, required a truthful and
impartial description.'
The majority held that Anchorage law did require a fair and
accurate description in the referendum petition." The court
further noted the screening purpose of the signature-gathering
requirement, which prevents an ordinance from being placed on the
ballot without a substantial showing of public support for the
initiative.66 The court reasoned that if a petition were to miscon-
strue an ordinance in a manner designed to cause opposition to the
ordinance, the screening purpose of the signature requirement
would be defeated.67 The court concluded that the public interest
in informed lawmaking mandated that the petition be fair and
accurate.' Chief Justice Moore dissented, arguing that the
majority improperly imposed state referendum requirements on
Anchorage referendum procedures. 69
Kleven v. Yukon-Koyukuk School Districi0 involved a
tenured educator who was given an unsatisfactory review by the
school district's superintendent. As a result of this negative review,
Kleven was reassigned to a lower-paying position in the district.7
He immediately began pursuing grievances against the district.72
A dispute arose as to what administrative grievance process Kleven
had to follow.7 3
After making an attempt to go through administrative
grievance procedures, Kleven filed suit against the district in
superior court. He moved for summary judgment on the issue
of his entitlement to a contract for the 1990-91 school year on
terms no less favorable than those he had enjoyed in the previous
school year.75 The district moved to convert the case into an
administrative appeal and asserted that Kleven had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. 76
64. Id. at 1219.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1219-20.
67. Id. at 1220.
68. Id. at 1221.
69. Id. (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
70. 853 P.2d 518 (Alaska 1993).
71. Id. at 520.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 521.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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While the motions were pending, Kleven took a super-
intendent's position in another district.' Thereafter, the trial
judge denied Kleven's summary judgment motion as moot and later
dismissed Kieven's lawsuit with prejudice.78 The judge ruled that
the case was in fact an administrative appeal and that Kleven had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.79
Kleven then brought a second lawsuit seeking to force the
district to take action on a list of grievances regarding his prior
employment with the district, including alleged safety violations.'
The court found that Kleven lacked standing to pursue his
grievances under both the interest-injury and the taxpayer-citizen
analyses. 81
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the lower court with
respect to the first lawsuit.' The court found that Kleven's claim
was not moot" because he had already worked at the lower-
paying job for several months before leaving the district. Thus, he
did suffer an injury due to the unsatisfactory evaluation.'
The court further held that the first lawsuit should not have
been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.'
The court noted that one of the reasons Kleven sought judicial
review was to determine the proper administrative procedure. 6
Since no further exhaustion of administrative remedies is required
when the form of the procedure itself is contested, the court
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it
dismissed the first lawsuit with prejudice."
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's disposition of the
second lawsuit.' The court agreed that Kleven had no standinA
under either the interest-injury or taxpayer-citizen theories.
Under the interest-injury theory, the court found that Kleven
lacked a sufficient personal stake in the second case to warrant
standing.' Since he was no longer employed by the district, he
77. Id.
78. Id. at 522.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 89-93.
82. Id. at 523.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 525.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 525-26.
90. Id. at 526.
[Vol. 11:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
was not subject to the grievance procedures nor threatened by the
alleged safety violations.91
Moreover, Kleven lacked standing under the taxpayer-citizen
theory. Under this theory, a party can be denied standing if there
is a potential plaintiff who is more directly affected by the conduct
in question and who has brought or is likely to bring suit. 2 Since
the current employees of the district were more suitable advocates
with respect to the issues involved, the court held that Kleven's
lawsuit was properly dismissed based on his lack of standing. 3
In State v. Cosio,94 two illegal aliens challenged the validity of
Alaska Administrative Code title 15, section 23.615(d),95 which
denied them eligibility for permanent fund dividends guaranteed by
statute to state residents. The superior court found that the regula-
tion was inconsistent with the statutory definition of "state resi-
dent."96 The Alaska Supreme Court granted a petition to review
this issue and also to determine whether the regulation was invalid
under the Alaska equal rights provision, Article I, section 3 of the
Alaska Constitution, or under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 97
The court held that the State "has the authority to promulgate
a regulation excluding permanent fund dividend applicants who
arguably fall within the statutory definition of eligible appli-
cants."98 Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8) defines a "state
resident" as "an individual who is physically present in the state
with the intent to remain permanently in the state."'  Alaska
Administrative Code title 15, section 23.615(d),"° however, limits
residency to those aliens who have been granted resident alien or
refugee status, implicitly excluding illegal aliens.10' The court
found this extension to make "abundant sense" and to be "consis-
tent with a public policy which regards it as unwise to reward
illegality."'" In so holding, the court accepted the State's propo-
sition that an agency may, by regulation, refine and add meaning
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993).
95. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.615(d) (Oct. 1988).
96. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 623.
97. Id. at 626.
98. Id. at 625.
99. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8) (1990).
100. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.615(d) (Oct. 1988).
101. Id.
102. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 625.
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to statutory language."3 However, the court noted that any
exclusion "must still be consistent with the statutory purpose and
'reasonable and not arbitrary."' 1 4
The Alaska Supreme Court then addressed the equal protec-
tion challenges and held that the eligibility of illegal aliens for eco-
nomic benefits should be analyzed under the "rational basis" test,
the most deferential standard of review.' The court concluded
that the eligibility requirements for permanent fund dividends were
"rationally related" to the "legitimate purposes underlying the
permanent fund dividends."'" These purposes included not
rewarding illegal activity, encouraging persons to maintain their
residence in Alaska, and increasing awareness and involvement by
residents in the management and expenditure of the permanent
fund.'4 7
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Burke found no indication that
the "legislature intended to commit the dividend eligibility of
certain classes of immigrants to the department's discretion." '
He argued that the Department of Revenue Commissioner had
therefore exceeded his regulatory authority in excluding aliens who
were not either refugees or resident aliens."° Additionally,
Justice Burke maintained that the majority "seriously misrepre-
sent[ed] federal immigration law"' in concluding that non-
resident aliens could not "form the intent necessary to establish
state residency.""'
In Manning v. Alaska Railroad Corp.," the court held that
the thirty-day appeal deadline in Alaska Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 602(a)(2) will apply to the decision of an administrative
agency only under a certain condition: when that agency has
"clearly indicate[d] that its decision is a final order and that the
claimant has thirty days to appeal.""' Without these two criteria
present, the court concluded that strict adherence to Rule 602(a)(2)
would "work surprise or injustice.""' 4 In so holding, the court
103. Id. at 624-25.
104. Id. at 625 (quoting Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 911 (Alaska 1971)).
105. Id. at 627.
106. Id. at 629.
107. Id. at 627.
108. Id. at 632 (Burke, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 632-33 (Burke, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 633 (Burke, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 634 (Burke, J., dissenting).
112. 853 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1993).
113. Id. at 1124.
114. Id.
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was choosing "to make explicit what [it] implied"" in Owsichek
v. State Guide Licensing & Control Board."6
C. Health Care
In State Department of Health & Social Services v. Hope
Cottages, Inc.," the Alaska Supreme Court held that under the
Alaska Medicaid payment statute,"8 the state was not required
to compensate on a dollar-for-dollar basis a health facility for its
workers' compensation premiums."9 Alaska's Medicaid statutes
were revised in 1988 to comply with the federal Boren Amend-
ment, which required states to make Medicaid payments that
are "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities.''
Previously, federal law required states to reimburse all reasonable
charges submitted by Medicaid providers. This amendment was
enacted to promote cost-cutting and efficiency among Medicaid
providers."m
The Alaska Supreme Court accepted the State's argument that
only the overall rate paid to a facility must be fair, and that each
component of a facility's costs need not be fairly compensated.'23
The court reasoned that such an approach was consistent with the
statutory goals of flexibility and efficiency.2 The Commission's
compensation scheme was upheld because Hope Cottages had not
presented evidence that the overall rate was unreasonable.'
2
Later in 1993, the supreme court decided another case that
centered on the Boren Amendment and its interaction with
Alaska's Medicaid payment statutes. In State Department of Health
& Social Services v. Alaska State Hospital and Nursing Home Ass'n.
("ASHNA"), 26 the court held that the State had failed to comply
with the Boren Amendment's findings requirement 27 in setting
Medicaid payment rates. At issue in the case was Alaska Adminis-
115. Id.
116. 627 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1981).
117. 863 P.2d 246 (Alaska 1993).
118. ALASKA STAT. § 47.07.070(a) (1990).
119. Hope Cottages, 863 P.2d at 247.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1992).
121. Id.
122. Hope Cottages, 863 P.2d at 248.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 250.
125. i at 251.
126. 856 P.2d 755 (Alaska 1993).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
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trative Code title 7, section 43.685(g), 128 which established an
emergency regulation that provided maximum limits on routine
rates paid by Alaska to medical care providers under the Medicaid
program. ASHNA successfully challenged the regulation on the
grounds that it did not meet the procedural requirements of the
Boren Amendment, which requires states to make findings and give
assurances to the federal government that the rates they set are
reasonable and adequate.29
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected a three-prong test estab-
lished by the Tenth Circuit" to determine the adequacy of
findings under the Boren Amendment because it was too restric-
tive. This test required states to determine and identify efficiently
and economically operated hospitals as well as the costs incurred
by those hospitals and then set payment rates sufficient to meet the
costs of those hospitals.' Although it rejected this analysis, the
supreme court still concluded that the state must make "concrete
findings, based on studies of existing facilities, and use these studies
to establish, with reference to either existing or hypothetical
facilities, an objective benchmark of an efficiently and economically
operated facility.'1 2
Ill. BusINEss LAW
Alaska Supreme Court decisions in the field of business law
covered various areas in 1993. The court considered such issues as
whether a party has a right to restitution if he contracts with an
incompetent person, the proper interpretation of contractual time
limitations, and the ability of a debtor-in-possession to retain
individual rights under a settlement agreement. In other decisions,
the court set out a test for establishing liability in a fraudulent
conveyance scheme and decided whether partners owe a duty of
good faith and fair dealing to assignees of partnership interests.
Finally, the court examined the question of whether personal
mortgage insurance is for the benefit of the mortgagor.
In CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,
CHI's liability reinsurer agreed to defend CHI against the contract
and negligence claims brought by an insured, but insisted on reserv-
ing its rights to disclaim coverage with respect to the insured's
128. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 43.685(g) (July 1993).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
130. AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Social Servs., 879 F.2d 789 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 935 (1990).
131. Id. at 796.
132. State Dep't of Health & Social Servs. v. Alaska State Hosp. & Nursing
Home Ass'n, 856 P.2d 755, 763 (Alaska 1993).
133. 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993).
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claim of intentional misconduct.3  CHI objected, claiming the
reservation of rights created a conflict of interest between CHI and
its reinsurer.135 CHI insisted on independent counsel paid for by
its reinsurer and chosen by CHI.36 The reinsurer offered a two-
counsel scheme, in which it would choose counsel to defend the
contract and negligence claims, while CII could have its own
attorney handle the intentional misconduct claim (not covered by
the reinsurance policy) at the reinsurer's expense."
The supreme court held the reinsurer's reservation of fights
gave CHI the right to retain independent counsel. The court
offered three rationales for its holding. First, if the loss which the
reinsurer was defending was not covered under the reinsurance
policy, the reinsurer may have offered only a token defense. 38
Second, if there were many theories of recovery, and at least one
was not covered by the reinsurance policy, the reinsurer might have
steered the plaintiff-insured toward the un-insured theory.
39
Third, the reinsurer might have gained access to privileged
information, which it might have used later to its advantage in
litigation with CHI concerning coverage.' 4°
The court next held that the proposed two-counsel scheme did
not satisfy CHI's right to independent counsel. The court noted
that the two-counsel scheme did not deny the reinsurer's appointed
counsel access to information in possession of CHI that might have
been used against CHI in later coverage litigation.'4 ' Finally, the
court held CHI should have unilaterally been able to select
independent counsel subject to the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing,142 leaving the reinsurer responsible only for the
reasonable costs of the defense.43 Justice Moore dissented on
this point, maintaining CHI's choice of counsel was subject to the
reasonable approval of the reinsurer.'" Justice Compton dissent-
ed from the entire opinion, citing the reinsurer's contract right to
participate in selection of counsel. 45
134. Id at 1114.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1116.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1121.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1122 (Moore, J., dissenting and concurring).
145. Id. at 1130-31 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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In Pappert v. Sargent,"46 the Alaska Supreme Court joined a
number of jurisdictions in holding that when a party contracts with
an incompetent person, in good faith and without actual or
constructive knowledge of the other's condition, that party is
entitled to restitution upon rescission of the contract.1 47 More-
over, the court concluded that an incompetent individual's right to
rescind such a contract may be defeated if the other party cannot
be restored to his original position.148 If a court determines, after
a hearing, "that meaningful restitution is not possible, it should
decline to void the transaction.'
149
Alaska Energy Authority v. Fairmont Insurance Co.' in-
volved the interpretation of contractual time limitations. A perfor-
mance bond issued by Fairmont to the Alaska Energy Authority
("ABA") included a limitation requiring AEA to bring suit under
the bond within two years of the date that final payment was due
to the contractor.' While the Alaska Supreme Court agreed
that AEA did not bring suit within the time limitation, it nonethe-
less reversed the summary judgment rendered in favor of Fairmont
by the superior court."
The supreme court's reasoning was based on Estes v. Alaska
Insurance Guarantee Ass'n,'53 which held that such contractual
time limitations would not be enforced without some showing of
prejudice to the insurer. 54 The court concluded that the purpose
of time limitations was to protect an insurer from prejudice due to
delay. 55  Therefore, if an insurer failed to demonstrate harm
from a delay, and thereby adequate prejudice, it could not prevail
on a motion for summary judgment. 56
In the instant case, Fairmont did not make such a showing of
prejudice. 7 The court found that Fairmont was not prejudiced
by the delay because it was put on notice of a possible claim before
the limitations period expired.'
146. 847 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1993).
147. Id. at 70.
148. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 15 cmt. f (1981)).
149. Id.
150. 845 P.2d 420 (Alaska 1993).
151. Id. at 421.
152. Id. at 422.
153. 774 P.2d 1315 (Alaska 1989).
154. Id. at 1320.
155. Id. at 1318.
156. Id. at 1320.
157. Alaska Energy Auth. v. Fairmont Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 420, 422-23 (Alaska
1993).
158. Id. at 423.
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Wagner v. Key Bank of Alaska159 involved a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding. The debtor-in-possession, in a settlement
agreement with one of the creditors, attempted to reserve rights as
an individual."6  After concluding that it had subject matter
jurisdiction, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the debtor-in-
possession did not have individual rights under the settlement
agreement.
The court's reasoning was two-fold. First, because a debtor-in-
possession acts as a fiduciary on behalf of the estate and its
creditors, he is not free to bargain in his individual capacity
"without regard to the interests of the estate or the estate's
creditors."' 62 Second, even if an attempt to gain individual rights
under the agreement was not a breach of fiduciary duty, the
debtor-in-possession "acted improperly in failing to fully disclose
his intentions and obtain express approval for his claimed individu-
al rights when he went before [the bankruptcy judge] requesting
approval for the proposed settlement."' 63
Summers v. Hagen'6 concerned an alleged fraudulent con-
veyance scheme between Summers (grantee of certain land) and
Hagen's debtor (grantor). 6 The Alaska Supreme Court held
that a creditor has a cause of action against a grantee of debtor's
property when that grantee has participated in a fraudulent convey-
ance.'66 To prove liability for participation in a fraudulent
conveyance scheme, the plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) An unlawful agreement;
(2) The specific intent of each participant in the scheme to
hinder, delay and defraud a creditor of one who participated in
the scheme;
(3) Acts committed pursuant to the unlawful agreement;
(4) Damages caused by the acts committed pursuant to the
unlawful agreement. 67
On the issue of Hagen's potential damages, the court held that
a creditor's rights are not limited to the remedy of voiding the
transfer, which is provided for under the Fraudulent Conveyances
Act." The plaintiff is not entitled to damages, however, if this
159. 846 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1993).
160. Id. at 113.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 117.
163. Id.
164. 852 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1993).
165. Id. at 1167.
166. Id. at 1169.
167. Id at 1169-70.
168. Id. at 1170 (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (1990)). The act reads,
in pertinent part, that a "conveyance... made with the intent to hinder, delay, or
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remedy is adequate.'69 If voiding the transfer is inadequate,
however, the plaintiff may collect damages equal to the lesser of
the value of the property fraudulently transferred or the amount of
the debt. 7  Exemplary damages and damages for emotional
distress are not available." Interest and attorney's fees are
permitted only to the extent that they are authorized under Alaska
Civil Rules 78(e) and 82.172
In Bauer v. Blomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture,'73 Bauer was
assigned the Holdens' interest in the defendant partnership as
security for a loan. 4 When the Holdens defaulted, Bauer gave
notice to the partnership that he was to receive distributions
payable to the Holdens.'
Eventually, the partners stopped making payments to Bauer.
The income of the partnership was used instead to pay a "commis-
sion" to one of the partners without Bauer's consent. 76 Bauer
brought suit, claiming that his assigned right to the Holdens' share
of partnership income had been violated.'"
A majority of the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal
of Bauer's claims, reasoning that as an assignee, Bauer was not a
de facto partner.7 8 Under Alaska Statutes section 32.05.220(a),
an assignee is not entitled "'to interfere in the management or
administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to require
any information or account of partnership transactions or to inspect
the partnership books.' ' 179 Section 32.05.220(a) only entitles the
assignee to "'receive the [partnership] profits to which the [Hold-
ens] would otherwise be entitled."' Therefore, the court held
that since the partners agreed to use the partnership income to pay
the commission, the Holdens, and thus Bauer, were not entitled to
receive distributions until that debt was paid in full.'
defraud creditors... is void." ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (1990).
169. Summers, 852 P.2d at 1170.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993).
174. Id. at 1366.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id at 1367.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.220(a) (1993)).
180. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 32.05.220(a) (1993)).
181. Id.
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The majority refused to hold that partners owe a duty of good
faith and fair dealing to assignees of partnership interests.' In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Matthews, joined by Chief Justice
Rabinowitz, argued that the partners did have such a duty, and that
this was the central issue in the case." An opposite conclusion,
Justice Matthews contended, would leave an assignee without a
remedy to enforce his right, making his assignment worthless.' 4
In Key Pacific Mortgage, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. of
Alaska,"s two mortgagees purchased an Errors and Omissions
("E&O") insurance policy from Industrial Indemnity. The policy
insured the mortgagees against losses resulting from a failure on
their part to maintain other insurance policies due to errors or
omissions."'
The primary issue in Key Pacific arose out of a mortgagor's
default. Mortgagors are required to pay for private mortgage
insurance ("PMI") to protect the mortgagee from a default by the
mortgagor.' 87 The mortgagee collects the premium for the PMI
and pays the PMI carrier." In the instant case, the mortgagees
did not pay PMI premiums on two mortgage loans that later went
into default.' The mortgagees suffered losses as a result of their
failure to maintain PMI insurance, and submitted claims to
Industrial Indemnity, which refused to pay for the losses.' 0
The relevant section of the E&O policy covered mortgagees
for the loss of policies that were procured and maintained for the
benefit of the mortgagor.'9' The issue was whether PMI was for
the benefit of the mortgagor.' 92 The mortgagees argued that
mortgagors with PMI are required to make lower down payments
and often are loaned money by PMI companies to pay a delinquen-
cy or help close a sale. 93 The Alaska Supreme Court found194
these benefits to the mortgagor to be incidental. It held that
such incidental benefits enjoyed by the mortgagor do not transform
182. Id. at 1367 n.2.
183. Id. at 1368 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Matthews, J., dissenting).
185. 845 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1993).
186. Id. at 1088.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1089.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1090.
194. Id.
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PMI into insurance "for the benefit of" the mortgagor."' Rather,
PMI insurance was for the benefit of the mortgagee."6 There-
fore, the E&O policy did not cover the lapse of PMI coverage.1 7
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court handed down decisions
interpreting both the Alaska Constitution and the United States
Constitution. While only two cases are included in this section,
constitutional issues arise in other areas as well, including the
sections summarizing administrative law and criminal law and
procedure.
State v. Gonzalez'9' concerned the constitutionality of Alaska
Statutes section 12.50.101,"9 which authorized prosecutors to
compel testimony based on a grant of "use and derivative use"
immunity.21 The court addressed two issues: (1) the scope of the
Alaska Constitution article I, section 9 privilege against self-incrimi-
nation; and (2) whether or not section 12.50.101 provides immunity
commensurate with the protection of the constitutional privi-
lege.2°'
The parties to this case agreed that the scope of article I,
section 9 was set out in E.L.L. v. State,202  which held that a
witness may refuse to testify if there is a "real or substantial hazard
of incrimination."2 3 Such a hazard is present if the witness's an-
swers "could support a conviction or might furnish a link in the
chain of evidence leading to a conviction.' 21
The court reviewed the question of whether the grant of use
and derivative use immunity removed the prohibited hazard of self-
incrimination. The court acknowledged that, in theory, use and
derivative use immunity should remove the danger.205 In practice,
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).
199. ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101 (1990).
200. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d at 528. Use and derivative use immunity allows
prosecutors to try the witness for crimes referred to in the compelled testimony,
but precludes the use of the compelled testimony itself in such prosecutions. This
is in contrast to transactional immunity which protects the compelled witness from
prosecution for the crime about which he/she must testify. Id.
201. Id. at 529.
202. 572 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1977).
203. Id. at 788.
204. ML
205. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d at 530.
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however, the court concluded that such immunity failed to do
so. ' First, there would be no way to prove whether the prosecu-
tion, either wittingly or unwittingly, used the compelled testimony
against the witness7 It would be impossible to trace the path
of the testimony through the government's offices from the time it
was given to the time it was used against the witness." In other
words, there would be no way to tell how widely disseminated the
testimony was within the prosecutor's office.' 9 The court felt
that any safeguards, such as isolating the prosecution team, could
be flouted."' In a similar vein, the court noted that highly publi-
cized compelled testimony could actually influence the testimony
of other witnesses at the compelled witness's subsequent prosecu-
tion.211
Second, the court feared that compelled testimony could serve
non-evidentiary uses for the prosecutors.212 For example, the
testimony could help them to, among other things, focus the
investigation, decide whether to initiate prosecution, decide
whether to plea bargain, interpret evidence and plan cross-
examination.213 The court found the possibility that the prosecu-
tion could gain such advantages to be unacceptable.214 Therefore,
because enforcing use and derivative use immunity was simply not
practicable, the court held that section 12.50.101 was unconstitu-
tional.2 1
5
In Marshall v. Munro,1 6 Reverend Marshall sued Reverend
Munro for defamation, tortious interference with a contract and
breach of contract.1 Marshall alleged that Munro, the Executive
Presbyter of Marshall's former congregation, made derogatory
statements about Marshall's qualifications as a pastor that led to
the loss of a job Marshall had secured with a church in Tennes-
see.21 8 The issue on appeal was whether civil courts were pre-
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 531.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 531-32.
213. Id. at 532.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 533.
216. 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993).
217. Id. at 425.
218. Id.
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
eluded under the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion from deciding the case.1 9
The First Amendment prohibits civil courts from interfering in
relationships between a church and its clergy or between various
members of the clergy." Both parties agreed that civil courts
should abstain where a case concerned issues of ecclesiastical
doctrine, faith, creed or internal discipline of an organized
church.Y
The Alaska Supreme Court first determined that it could not
decide the breach of contract claim, as a resolution of this issue
would have required an interpretation of the employment relation-
ship between Marshall and Munro.' The court reasoned that
since the First Amendment forbids courts to imply contractual
duties on religious entities, Marshall was forced to look to
administrative remedies within the church.'
However, the court held that it must decide the claims of defa-
mation and interference with a contract.224 The court agreed with
Marshall that such claims did not touch upon church laws or policy
because the claims merely involved secular legal and factual
issues.2
The court was not persuaded, however, by Munro's argument
that such claims concerned Marshall's qualifications as a pastor.26
The court concluded that the defamation claim only related to
whether Munro's statements were true or, if not true, were made
with malice.2 7 Furthermore, the interference with contract claim
required only that "1) a contract existed; 2) Munro knew of and
intended to interfere with the contract; 3) Munro did in fact
interfere with the contract; and 4) Munro's interference caused
Marshall's damages."'  The court found that neither of the
inquiries involved an ecclesiastical dispute or an internal discipline
proceeding. 9  Therefore, the claims could be resolved without
consideration of Munro's duties to the church and, consequently,
were within a civil court's jurisdiction?20
219. Id. at 426.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 427.
222. Id. at 428.
223. Id.
224. 1&
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 429.
230. Id.
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V. CRIMINAL LAW
The past year brought a wide variety of criminal law cases
before the Alaska Court of Appeals and the Alaska Supreme
Court. These diverse cases have been divided into two main
categories, constitutional protections and general criminal law.
These categories are further divided into more specific areas.
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure. In Eldridge v. State,"' Eldridge
appealed the use of evidence obtained from a pat-down search," 2
which was conducted by probation officers who suspected Charles
Smith, Eldridge's travelling companion, of possessing cocaine. 3
When the officers stopped Smith, they performed a pat-down
search of Eldridge, which revealed a small amount of rock
cocaine.' Eldridge was later convicted of misconduct involving
a controlled substance in the third degree. 5
On appeal, Eldridge claimed that the search was improper and
that the evidence obtained from it should have been sup-
pressed. 6 Although it was not absolutely clear, the trial court's
basis for admitting the results of the search seemed to have been
the "automatic companion" rule. 7 On appeal, the Alaska Court
of Appeals held that this rule was not the proper standard in Alas-
ka.? Rather, a case-by-case approach was to be employed,
having as its fundamental inquiry whether an immediate investiga-
tion was required as a matter of practical necessity. 39 The court
of appeals remanded the case so that the trial court could apply the
appropriate test in determining whether the search was proper.2
231. 848 P.2d 834 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
232. Id. at 835.
233. Id.
234. 1& at 836.
235. IL at 835.
236. Id. at 836.
237. Id. at 837 (citing United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.
1971)). The automatic companion rule states, "All companions of [an] arrestee
within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the
officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory 'pat-down' reasonably
necessary to assure that they are unarmed." Id.
238. Ik at 838.
239. 1& (citing State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)).
240. Id. at 838-39.
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Johnson v. Johnson24 involved a search and seizure by the
Fairbanks police department.24 2 The police, pursuant to a valid
search warrant, seized drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons and
$44,850.243 The money that was taken was not returned.2"
Upon action by the defendant, Johnson, the superior court deter-
mined that an "adoptive seizure"' by the DEA had deprived
Johnson of title to his money.
2
"
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, stating that the federal
forfeiture was void. 7 The court rejected the city's claim that the
money was actually the property of the federal government and
that by transferring the money to the DEA, the city was simply
returning it to its proper owner.2" The supreme court reasoned
that the lower court was the first to obtain jurisdiction over the
money.249 Furthermore, the city's transfer of money to the DEA
constituted conversion, as it violated state forfeiture law regarding
the disposition of property held in connection with a criminal
proceeding." Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions
that summary judgment be entered in Johnson's favor.2
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Ray,' 2 the municipality of
Anchorage appealed the suppression of results from an involuntary
blood test. 3 Following a car accident, the police requested that
Ray submit to a blood test for alcohol content.'" Ray refused,
and the blood was taken without his permission.255 Consequently,
the district court suppressed the results of the test. 6 Although
Ray was charged under the Municipal Code, the parties to the
appeal argued the case under equivalent state statutes,' 7 includ-
241. 849 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
242. Id. at 1362.
243. Id.
244. Id,
245. An adoptive seizure occurs when a local police department transfers seized
property that may be subject to forfeiture pursuant to federal drug laws to the
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"). In other words, the DEA "adopts" the
seizure.
246. Johnson, 849 P.2d at 1363.
247. Id. at 1362.
248. Id. at 1363.
249. Id. at 1364.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 854 P.2d 740 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
253. Id. at 743.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 742-43.
256. Id. at 743.
257. Id.
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ing Alaska Statutes section 28.35.035.25s Ray argued that the
police were required to ask him to participate in a breath test
before they could force him to submit to a blood testy 9 Ray
admitted that on its face Alaska Statutes section 28.35.035(a) allows
police to force suspected drunk drivers to submit to a chemical test
of their blood whenever there is an injury or death involved in the
situation.' However, Ray introduced evidence of the law's
background in an attempt to overcome the presumtion that a
statute is interpreted according to its plain meaning.?
6  t
The Alaska Court of Appeals held that section 28.35.035(a)
"authorizes the police to require a motorist to submit to a blood
test even though there has been no prior attempt to obtain the
motorist's consent to a breath test., 262
Ray argued that this interpretation of section 28.35.035(a)
would be a violation of his constitutional rights under the due
process and search and seizure provisions of the United States and
Alaska Constitutions.2 63 Moreover, he contended that his rights
under the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution would be
violated.264 The court, relying heavily on United States Supreme
Court precedent dealing with the issue of forced blood tests, found
no constitutional violations and reversed the district court's
suppression of the test results. 5
2. Miscellaneous. In Hays v. State,266 Hays challenged the
reasonableness of the suspicion under which a state trooper
stopped Hays' vehicle.267 The trooper had stopped Hays' truck
because it resembled the description of a vehicle involved in the
258. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.035 (Supp. 1993). Alaska Statutes section
28.35.035(a) states:
If a person is under arrest for an offense arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed while the person was operating a motor vehicle ...
while intoxicated, and that arrest results from an accident that causes
death or physical injury to another person, a chemical test may be
administered without the consent of the person arrested to determine the
amount of alcohol in that person's breath or blood.
Id.
259. Ray, 854 P.2d at 744.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 745-47.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 748.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 751.
266. 850 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
267. Id. at 652.
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theft of gasoline from a local service station.2" Although it was
eventually determined that the truck was not the same one
involved in the crime, it was also discovered that Hays was driving
with a revoked license, an offense with which he was eventually
charged.269
Alaska law permits investigative stops when there is a "reason-
able suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm
to persons or property has recently occurred.""27 Alaska uses a
flexible approach in applying this standard.271 A well-founded
suspicion that a crime is occurring or has just occurred may justify
a stop even though the offense is not particularly serious.272 A
more severe threat to public safety may justify a stop even after
considerable time has passed.273
In Hays' case, the Alaska Court of Appeals found that a sub-
stantial amount of time had passed between the crime's occurrence
and the stop of his vehicle.274 Furthermore, there was little
connection between Hays' vehicle and the truck involved in the gas
theft, as the vehicles had different license plate numbers,275 a fact
realized by the trooper soon after the stop.276 Finally, the court
stated that the key inquiry in every case is whether "'a prompt
investigation [was] required ... as a matter of practical necessi-
ty.," 2" The court found no practical necessity in the stop of
Hays' vehicle because the alleged offense was minor in nature and
considerable time had passed since the initial report of the
theft.278 Accordingly, the court held that the stop was improp-
er.
279
May v. State'0 involved an appeal by the defendant of his
conviction on one count of first-degree burglary and one count of
third-degree theft. May was apprehended after an informant told
police officers that May and his son were going to commit a
burglary. 1  Police officers searched May's car and found three
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. (citing Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976)).
271. Id. at 653.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. (quoting State v. G.B., 769 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 856 P.2d 793 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
281. Id.
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jewelry boxes identified as belonging to the owner of the house
which May allegedly had burglarized.' An investigator ques-
tioned May until the suspect requested an attorney. Shortly
thereafter, however, May told officers that he wished to speak
again with the investigator.' The investigator informed May
that the conversation was going to be recorded and asked, "Do you
want to have an attorney present first, or do you want to talk to me
about something?"' May, without counsel present, confessed to
the burglary.26
After conviction on burglary and theft charges, May appealed,
arguing that the police had violated his right to counsel by continu-
ing the discussion without his attorney present. In the alternative,
May contended that the officers should have re-advised him of his
Miranda rights.'
The Alaska Court of Appeals noted that the investigator had
done nothing to discourage the defendant from exercising his right
to counsel and had in fact established that the defendant wished to
resume the conversation without an attorney present.' Under
these facts, the court ruled that Quick v. State controlled and
that, therefore, the police were not required to re-advise the
defendant of his Miranda rights or refrain from continuing their
questioning after the defendant, having previously invoked his right
to counsel, again commenced speaking to the officers.2'
Flynn v. State291 focused on the appeal of the admission of a
police officer's testimony at trial.2' In Flynn, the defendant was
questioned by the police and confessed to penetrating a six-month-
old child.29 At the trial, where Flynn was convicted of one count
of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor,2 94 one of the officers who
questioned Flynn stated, "In my experience, as to date, I have yet
to have an innocent person confess.,
29 5
282. Id.
283. Id. at 794.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979).
290. May, 856 P.2d at 794.
291. 847 P.2d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
292. Id. at 1075.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1074.
295. Id.
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Flynn claimed that the officer's statement, in effect, allowed
the officer to tell the jury, as an expert witness, that the confession
was truthful.296 The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed and re-
versed the conviction, finding that the statement unduly prejudiced
the defendant by enabling the officer to act like a "human poly-
graph. ' 2
97
The court also addressed Flynn's allegation that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction because no evidence
of his age was introduced at trial.298 The court held that a jury
can properly infer age from testimony relating to other issues at
trial, and that the State need not present direct evidence of age.29
The court found that the evidence of Flynn's drinking, the
description of him as a "short statured man," and the references to
him as a criminal suspect (as opposed to a juvenile delinquent)
were enough to allow the jury to infer that he was more than
sixteen years old.3"
McKillop v. State"0 1 involved an appeal of an harassment con-
viction." 2 The defendant made anonymous phone calls to the
Anchorage Abused Women's Aid in Crisis shelter and was
convicted under Alaska Statutes section 11.61.120(a)(4)."
McKillop claimed that his conviction was invalid for several
reasons: (1) it was based on illegally seized evidence; (2) the jury
was instructed incorrectly as to the meaning of the term "anony-
mous"; and (3) the harassment statute was unconstitutional. 3°
McKillop had been arrested at the motel from which he was
making the phone calls.3 5  When he came to the door in re-
sponse to the police officers' knock, McKillop was both naked and
drunk.05 He first denied making the calls, but then admitted the
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1076.
298. Id. To prove guilt of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree under
Alaska Statutes section 11.41.434(a)(1), the state must establish that the defendant
was at least 16 years of age. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434(a)(1) (1989).
299. Flynn, 847 P.2d at 1076.
300. Id. at 1077.
301. 857 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
302. Id. at 359.
303. Id. The text of Alaska Statutes section 11.61.120(a)(4) reads as follows:
"A person commits the crime of harassment if, with intent to harass or annoy
another person, that person... (4) makes an anonymous or obscene telephone
call or a telephone call that threatens physical injury . . . ." ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.61.120(a)(4) (Supp. 1993).
304. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 359.
305. Id. at 360.
306. Id.
[Vol. 11:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
offense to the police."°  At trial, the court denied McKillop's
request to exclude an incriminating statement on the grounds that
the evidence had been obtained as part of a warrantless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. 08
The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's
denial, finding that the officers did not violate McKillop's Fourth
Amendment rights when they entered his room because he was not
"in custody" at the time?' The court found that it was reasonable
to take the conversation inside due to the defendant's nudity. 1
Although McKillop did question the officers' authority to be there,
the court of appeals found that he never asked the police to leave
nor otherwise demonstrated that he wanted them to leave'
Therefore, it was not clearly erroneous to allow McKillop's state-
ments to be admitted into evidence.312
The statute under which McKillop was sentenced requires that
the phone calls be "anonymous. 3 3  In his second point of
contention with the lower court's holding, McKillop argued that his
phone calls to the shelter were not "anonymous" because he had
divulged his telephone number and room number, inviting
discovery of his identity.314 The court of appeals found that the
common meaning of "anonymous" centers on the withholding of
one's name.311 Thus, since McKillop gave no reason why the
term "anonymous" should be interpreted in the non-standard way
he suggested, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to follow McKillop's proposed
definition.1 6
Lastly, McKillop argued that the statute prohibiting his con-
duc 17 was unconstitutionally broad and attached criminal penal-
ties to free speech in violation of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.318 The court found that, when read
in conjunction with the general definition of "intentionally" in
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 360-61.
310. Id. at 361.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(4) (Supp. 1993).
314. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 361.
315. Id. at 362.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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another statute,319 the provision under which McKillop was
charged may potentially have been broad enough to infringe on an
individual's right of free speech.32 However, the court held that
the statutory provision can be constitutionally valid when limited
to a caller's speech that is devoid of any substantive information,
and where the caller's sole intention is to annoy or harass the
recipient.32 ' Thus, when a court gives a jury instruction limiting the
statutory interpretation in this way, the application is neither vague
nor overbroad.3' However, in McKillop, the trial court did not
provide a proper jury instruction limiting the scope of the statute,
instead instructing the jury that "[a] person may act intentionally
with respect to causing a particular result even though causing that
result was not the person's only objective.' 3z The court held this
instruction to be infirm because it allowed a jury to find McKillop
guilty even if harassment were not his only intention. Therefore
the conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new
trial.324
In Miller v. State,3' the defendant filed a pro se application
for post-conviction relief; alleging that his conviction was the result
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Miller also filed an affidavit of
indigency requesting that the court appoint counsel for him.326
The superior court gave Miller notice that it was going to dismiss
his application without appointing counsel unless the application
was amended so that it made out a prima facie case for ineffective
assistance of counsel.327
The Alaska Court of Appeals, citing Donnelly v. State,32S re-
versed this decision.32 9 In Donnelly, the Alaska Supreme Court
determined that an indigent applicant for post-conviction relief is
entitled to court-appointed counsel "at the time the initial applica-
tion is filed.'330 Therefore, Miller was entitled to counsel in his
pursuit of post-conviction relief.33
319. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(a)(1) (1989).
320. McKillop, 857 P.2d at 364.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 365.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 365-66.
325. 857 P.2d 1210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. 516 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1973).
329. Miller, 857 P.2d at 1211.
330. Donnelly, 516 P.2d at 399.
331. Miller, 857 P.2d at 1211.
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Haynes v. State332 came before the Alaska Supreme Court
after Haynes' license was revoked due to his arrest for driving
while intoxicated.333 At the time of arrest, Haynes' breath was
tested with an "Intoximeter 3000," which produced a reading of
.106 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.y Although this
level of intoxication is above the .10 level set by law, the In-
toximeter 3000 has a .01 margin of error.335
If the margin had been applied in Haynes' favor, he would
have been below the .10 limit and would not have lost his li-
cense.336 The Alaska Supreme Court determined that because
there was no indication that the legislature took the margin of error
into consideration in setting the .10 level, the margin of error must
be considered when determining whether someone is over the .10
level.337
The court further determined that due process requires the
application of the .01 margin of error in the defendant's favor when
determining whether his breath exceeded the statutory level. 8
Finally, the court ruled that extrinsic evidence of intoxication does
not mitigate the inherent error found in the Intoximeter.339
Therefore, the court reversed the revocation of Haynes' license.
Chief Justice Rabinowitz and Justice Matthews both dissented
from the majority's opinion, asserting that it changed the statutorily
determined level of .10 to .11.' The dissent noted that such a
result was improper under the plain meaning rule used in interpret-
ing Alaska statutes. 341
B. General Criminal Law
1. Evidence. In Shepard v. State,342 the defendant con-
tended that the trial court erred when it prevented an expert
witness from testifying for the defense.34 3 Shepard had wanted to
introduce two expert witnesses who would testify about post-
traumatic stress disorder, a psychological condition Shepard claimed
332. 865 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1993).
333. Id. at 754.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 756.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 757 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 761 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
342. 847 P.2d 75 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
343. Id. at 76.
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to suffer from as a result of his participation in the war in Viet-
nam.3' He claimed that post-traumatic stress disorder and not
consciousness of guilt had led him to conceal the shooting for which
he was on trial.3 5
The trial court excluded the testimony of one of the expert
witnesses because the witness had never directly examined the
defendant, and because the proposed testimony merely amounted
to "questionable psychological profile evidence." " The Alaska
Court of Appeals reversed, noting that evidence of a novel
psychological profile, not yet generally accepted as valid, is not
admissible in Alaska if it is used to show that a defendant would
testify truthfully or act unlawfully simply because he fits that
proffle.' 7 However, the court went on to hold that such psycholog-
ical evidence is not barred if it merely establishes "that certain
testimony is not necessarily untruthful or that certain conduct is not
necessarily indicative of guilt. 348
In this case, the Alaska Court of Appeals found that the ques-
tionable testimony was intended only to provide the jury with a
more complete understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder.349
Therefore, the witness' testimony was admissible. 5
In McGlauflin v. State,35' McGlauflin alleged that his convic-
tion on several counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and
first-degree sexual assault was flawed because (1) he had never
waived his right to a jury trial352 and (2) the victim's testimony
should have been suppressed as tainted because her memory had
previously been enhanced through hypnosis.353 On the first issue,
the Alaska Court of Appeals found that a written waiver of a
defendant's right to a jury trial was not required when an effective
oral waiver was given.' However, the court found that despite
the trial judge's direct questioning of McGlauflin, the waiver was
ineffective because "the court did not seek to determine whether
McGlauflin understood the right he was relinquishing or the
consequences of his choice."355  Therefore, a reversal of Mc-
344. Id. at 77.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 78.
347. Id. at 80.
348. Id. at 81.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. 857 P.2d 366 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
352. Id. at 368.
353. Id. at 369.
354. Id. at 368 (citing Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Alaska 1978)).
355. Id. at 369.
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Glauflin's conviction was required. 6
The court of appeals, however, still found it necessary to
address the admissibility of testimony at trial given by a previously
hypnotized victim. 7 The court looked to Contreras v. State"'8
to resolve this issue.359 In Contreras, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the process of being hypnotized was sufficiently likely to
distort a witness' sincerity as to make the testimony inadmissi-
ble?3 ° However, in Contreras the supreme court did not com-
pletely bar testimony of a previously hypnotized person. Rather,
the witness, the supreme court held, may testify about facts he or
she related prior to the hypnosis 61
The victim's testimony in McGlauflin was admissible362
because it did not fall within the Contreras rule. The Contreras
rule was intended to eliminate testimony based on false memories,
which can be created when hypnosis is used to refresh or enhance
a witness' memory. Unlike the hypnosis in Contreras, which was
designed to enhance the witness' memory of the actual events at
issue in the case, the hypnosis in the instant case only briefly
touched on the sexual abuse. The primary purpose of the session
was to improve the victim's self-confidence and work on her weight
problem. The hypnosis never probed the victim's memories of
the allegedly abusive events.36 As such, none of the dangers that
Contreras sought to protect against were present.365
In Nunn v. State66 Nunn appealed his conviction, for second-
degree sexual abuse of a minora 7 on two grounds: (1) that the
videotape of the police interview with the victim (J.A.B.) should
not have been played for the jury6 and (2) that the former
assistant district attorney's testimony should have been exclud-
ed. 369
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
359. McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 369-72.
360. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 139.
361. Id.
362. McGlauflin, 857 P.2d at 379.
363. Id. at 374.
364. Id. at 379.
365. Id
366. 845 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
367. Id. at 437.
368. Id. at 440.
369. Id. at 444.
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The videotape was admitted at trial because it contained prior
inconsistent statements of J.A.B.37° On the tape, J.A.B. accused
Nunn of sexual abuse, but at trial she recanted and claimed that
she had made up the accusations.37 Nunn claimed that the tape
was inadmissible because J.A.B. was already confronted with her
prior inconsistent statements and admitted making them.372
The Alaska Court of Appeals upheld the admissibility of the
videotape because it preserved the demeanor of J.A.B. during
questioning.373 Thus, it helped the jury to decide whether to
believe J.A.B.'s trial testimony or her conflicting prior state-
ments.374 The court also held that the videotape could be admit-
ted without requiring the prosecution to ask J.A.B. about each and
every statement made on the tape.375
The court also upheld the admissibility of the former assistant
district attorney's testimony.376 The assistant district attorney had
prepared the case against Nunn for presentation to the grand jur
and had interviewed the victim shortly before she recanted. 77
The prosecutor sought to use the assistant district attorney as a
witness at trial to prove the truthfulness of the victim's earlier
allegations.378 Nunn argued that such testimony was a violation
of Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A),379 which states that it is an ethical
violation for a firm to represent an individual where a member of
the firm will be called as a witness on behalf of the client.3' The
court rejected Nunn's argument, holding that the prosecutor's office
was not like a normal law firm.38' Furthermore, because of the
non-attorney role that the former district attorney played in
testifying at trial, the court held that "there was no violation of the
ethical and litigation concerns underlying [Disciplinary Rule] 5-102(A). 382
March v. State3' involved an appeal by a defendant of his
conviction for flying into a hunting area and killing a bull moose on
370. Id. at 440.
371. Id at 439.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 441.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 446.
377. Id. at 445-46.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 444 (citing ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-102(A) (1980)).
380. ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(A) (1980).
381. Nunn, 845 P.2d at 445-46.
382. Id. at 446.
383. 859 P.2d 714 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
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the same day."8 March argued that the state violated his right to
due process by failing to visit and gather evidence at the kill site,
which March claimed would have shown that only his companion
had shot the moose.3 5
The Alaska Court of Appeals found that March's argument
misconstrued the State's duty to preserve evidence,386 which
attaches only after the State takes possession of evidence.31
Here, the State never had possession of the evidence; therefore, the
duty of preservation was never activated.3m
The Alaska Court of Appeals held in State v. McLaughlin. 9
that a trial court may not bar the State from presenting evidence
of a necessary element of a crime even though the defendant has
conceded to that element.3l The case involved the possession of
a concealable firearm by a previously convicted felon.39' The
defendant conceded the existence of a prior felony conviction, and,
therefore, the trial court concluded that evidence of prior convic-
tions would be inadmissible unless such evidence became relevant
to specific issues arising during trial.392 The State argued that
precluding admission of evidence showing a necessary element of
the crime (commission of a prior felony) would leave the jury with
an inaccurate impression that the defendant was being prosecuted
for permissible conduct (mere possession of a firearm). 93 The
court of appeals balanced concerns of strict evidentiary relevance
with the State's right to present the "legitimate moral force of [its]
evidence., 39 a The court adopted the State's reasoning, concluding
that while the evidence had the potential to be prejudicial, there
was "little basis to distrust the jury's ability to make proper use of
necessary evidence, even when that evidence reveals previous
wrongdoing by the accused. 395
State v. Hazelwood396 was an appeal from the conviction of
Captain Joseph J. Hazelwood for grounding the Exxon Valdez and
384. Id. at 715.
385. Id. at 716.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. 860 P.2d 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
390. Id. at 1278.
391. Id. at 1271.
392. Id. at 1272.
393. Id. at 1274.
394. Id. at 1273 (quoting IX JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2591 (1981)).
395. Id. at 1277-78.
396. 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1993).
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spilling eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound."l
Hazelwood had reported the grounding to the Coast Guard twenty
minutes after it occurred.398 At trial in superior court, Hazelwood
moved to dismiss all charges against him, claiming that "all of the
State's evidence was derived either directly or indirectly from his
notification, and that its admission violated the immunity granted
by 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). 399
Section 1321(b)(5), which sets forth the federal reporting
requirement for oil and hazardous substances discharges, includes
a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution based on the re-
port.' Hazelwood had argued before the court of appeals "that
by admitting evidence derived from this notification, the superior
court violated this statutory grant of immunity." '' The court of
appeals agreed and overturned Hazelwood's conviction.
The State appealed, arguing that their evidence was admissible
on either of two rationales: (1) that the State had demonstrated
that it had an independent source for its evidence or (2) that the
immunity provided by 33 U.S.C. section 1321 (b)(5)4" was subject
to an inevitable discovery exception. 403  First the State argued
that the only part of the captain's statement eligible for protection
from prosecution was the portion in which Hazelwood stated that
the tanker "evidently [was] leaking some oil.' '41 The State
claimed that any additional information "was reported pursuant to
the marine casualty statute,40 5 and thus amounted to a source of
evidence wholly independent of the immunized statement."4"
397. Id. at 828.
398. Id. Hazelwood stated, "Yeah, ah Valdez back, ah we've, should be on
your radar there, we've fetched up ah hard aground, north of Goose Island, off
Bligh Reef, and ah evidently leaking some oil and we're gonna be here for awhile
and ah, if you want ah, so you're notified, over." Id.
399. Id.
400. The statute reads in relevant part: "Notification received pursuant to this
paragraph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall
not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury or for giving a false statement." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988) (amended
1990).
401. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d at 830.
402. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988) (amended 1990).
403. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d at 828. The inevitable discovery doctrine is an
exception to the exclusionary rule. It allows for the admission of evidence which
was obtained through a constitutional violation if that evidence would inevitably
have been discovered lawfully. Id. at 832.
404. Id. at 830.
405. 46 U.S.C. § 6101 (1988) (requiring the reporting of a wide variety of
marine casualties).
406. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d at 830 (citation omitted).
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The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed, finding that federal law
required an admissible statement to be "wholly independent" of the
immunized statement.4 7 Because the statement here was a single
radio transmission and could not be divided in the way the State
proposed, the supreme court affirmed this portion of the court of
appeals' opinion.'
The State next contended that the inevitable discovery doctrine
applied because it would have discovered and investigated the
grounding even if Hazelwood had failed to report it.4 09 In deter-
mining if such exceptions to the exclusionary rule are valid, the
court balances the societal costs of excluding the evidence against
the interest in immunizing statements from use in a prosecu-
tion.4 a0 The court found that the State's interest in encouraging
parties to report such accidents would not be impaired by the
adoption of the inevitable discovery exception. The court decided
that the stiff penalties for failing to report a spill contained in 33
U.S.C. section 1321(b)(5) would encourage people to report such
accidents even if the statute's grant of immunity might be under-
mined by the acceptance of this exception to the exclusionary
rule.41' Therefore, the balance weighed in favor of admission,
and accordingly the court held that the inevitable discovery
exception applied.41 2
2. Criminal Procedure. The issue in Owen v.
Matsumoto413 was whether the superior court had appellate
jurisdiction over a Department of Corrections sentencing calcula-
tion. Owen, serving time for armed robbery, applied to the
Department of Corrections ("DOC") for review of his sentence
calculation.n4 The DOC rejected his claim, and Owen appealed
his sentence calculation to the superior court, which dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. 5 The Alaska Supreme Court found no
statutory provision conferring upon the superior court the power to
review a Department of Corrections administrative decision. 6
Owen argued, however, that an exception was created whenever
inmate disciplinary proceedings raised fundamental constitutional
407. Id. at 831.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 831 n.7.
410. Id. at 833.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 834.
413. 859 P.2d 1308 (Alaska 1993).
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1309.
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questions.4 7 The court agreed that this was a valid exception, but
found that the record of the administrative proceeding was
inadequate for review.418 Hence, the court affirmed the superior
court's dismisal of Owen's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction
and held that the proper procedure for review of Owen's claim was
to request post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35.1.419
The Alaska Court of Appeals held in Kolkman v. State42"
that a trial court necessarily removes the voluntariness of the
defendant's plea when it rejects a plea agreement. 421  Therefore,
the trial court is required to give the defendant the opportunity to
either withdraw or affirm the original plea of guilty or no con-
test.4' In Kolkman's case, the trial court rejected the initial plea
bargain because it called for the imposition of an illegal sen-
tence.4' However, the trial court never allowed Kolkman an
opportunity to withdraw his plea personally in open court.424 The
trial court therefore violated Kolkman's right to make a voluntary
and intelligent plea of guilty or no contest by leaving this choice to
Kolkman's counsel.4  Consequently, the amended plea agree-
ment, entered into by Kolkman's counsel, was vacated.426
State i. Williams427 dealt with the issue of collateral estoppel.
In Williams, the trial court dismissed the defendant's first criminal
indictment due to insufficient evidence.4' The State then recon-
figured the charges and succeeded in securing a second indictment
from another grand jury.429 The trial court concluded that
substantially the same evidence had been presented to the first and
second grand juries43 and, therefore, collateral estoppel preclud-
ed the State from reopening the case.431
The Alaska Court of Appeals reversed, noting the three
requirements for collateral estoppel: (1) that the issue decided
previously must have been precisely the same as that presented in
the current litigation; (2) that the previous litigation must have
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 1309-10.
420. 857 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
421. Id. at 1209.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. (citing ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d)).
426. Id. at 1210.
427. 855 P.2d 1337 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
428. Id. at 1340.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 1341.
431. Id.
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resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) that there must
be "mutuality" between the parties involved in the previous and
current litigation.432 The court held that the dismissal of the first
indictment did not constitute a final judgment resolving, on the
merits, the question of the sufficiency of evidence before the
second grand jury.433 The court explained that a contrary holding
would put the collateral estoppel doctrine at odds with the
prevailing rule which allows the state to seek reindictment
following a dismissal for insufficient evidence.4
3. Sentencing. The appeal in Christensen v. State435 arose
when the defendant pleaded no contest to felony importation of
alcoholic beverages into a dry community.436  Christensen's
sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for two
years. The conditions of her probation were that she spend forty-
five days in jail and then, if necessary, participate in residential
alcohol treatment of unspecified duration.437
Only after Christensen's release from jail did the trial court
finalize the sentence by setting a maximum length of residential
treatment. Christensen appealed, claiming a violation of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.4 38
The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with Christensen and
reversed the trial court's modification. The court distinguished
Figueroa v. State,' wherein modification was allowed because the
trial court had inadvertently failed to specify the length of proba-
tion." Specifically, the court noted that until the length of
probation is set, a trial court's sentencing order lacks an essential
element and can be modified. 2 In Christensen's case, however,
the sentencing order contained all of the essential elements (total
length of imprisonment, portion of this total to be suspended and
length of the defendant's probation)." 3 The only flaw lay in one
of the probation conditions. The appellate court reiterated the
432. Id. at 1342.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1343.
435. 844 P.2d 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 557-58. Such conditioning of probation is authorized, but the court
must also specify a maximum length of residential treatment. ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.100(a)(6) (1990).
438. Christensen, 844 P.2d at 558.
439. Id.
440. 689 P.2d 512 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
441. Id. at 514.
442. Christensen, 844 P.2d at 559.
443. Id.
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principle that a sentence should not be increased unless absolutely
necessary to correct some illegality.' The flaw in Christensen's
sentence could have been cured by striking the requirement of
residential alcohol treatment.445
In Wickham v. State,"6 the issue on appeal was whether the
use of Wickham's prior convictions, which should have been set
aside under Alaska Statutes section 12.55.085, was proper for
impeachment purposes."7 Section 12.55.085 affords a sentencing
court discretion to set aside a conviction if the person (1) received
a suspended sentence and (2) successfully completed his subsequent
probation.' Alaska Rule of Evidence 609 mandates that a prior
conviction can be used for impeachment purposes even if it has
been set aside, unless the set-aside procedure "required a substan-
tial showing of rehabilitation."" 9 The Alaska Court of Appeals
held that under section 12.55.085, a successful completion of
probation was a prima facie showing of rehabilitation .4  By
placing the burden on the State to show why the conviction should
not be set aside, and by allowing the sentencing court to make the
ultimate set-aside decision, section 12.55.085 does require "a
substantial showing of rehabilitation., 451  Accordingly, the court
concluded that a conviction set aside pursuant to section 12.55.085
may not be used for impeachment purposes. 452
The State then argued that the convictions should still be avail-
able for impeachment purposes because they were not set aside
before Wickham was tried on the instant charge.453 The court
disagreed, maintaining that Wickham should not be penalized
merely because the prior convictions were not removed from his
record in a timely fashion.454
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. 844 P.2d 1140 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
447. Id. at 1141.
448. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085 (1992).
449. ALASKA R. EVID. 609.
450. Wickham, 844 P.2d at 1143.
451. Id. at 1144. The instant case arose following a remand in a prior decision
in which the court of appeals ordered the superior court to conduct a hearing on
whether Wickham's prior convictions should be set aside. Wickham v. State, 770
P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). The superior court ruled that the convictions
should be set aside, at which point the court of appeals, having retainedjurisdiction over the appeal, considered the question at issue in this case.
Wickham, 844 P.2d at 1141.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1145.
454. Id. at 1146.
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4. Miscellaneous. Guertin v. State45 presented the issue
of whether attempted second-degree sexual assault is a crime under
Alaska law,456 particularly under the rule enunciated in Huitt v.
State.457 The holding in Huitt, which involved an attempted
murder charge, was premised on the idea that "attempt" requires
proof of intent.458  However, once intent to commit murder is
established, the state has proven all of the requisite elements of
attempted first-degree murder.459 Therefore, the crime of at-
tempted second-degree murder was found to be unnecessary
because "anyone who engages in life-threatening conduct with the
requisite culpable mental state for attempted murder (intent to kill)
is necessarily guilty, not only of 'attempted second-degree murder,'
but also of attempted first-degree murder."'
The Guertin court found that the reasoning in Huitt did not,
however, preclude the existence of attempted second-degree sexual
assault. 6' The court of appeals stated that the crime of sexual
assault in the second-degree involves the defendant knowingly
engaging in sexual contact with another person with reckless
disregard for the other person's consent.462 The court held that
a person is guilty of attempt if he has the intent to commit the
crime and takes a substantial step toward its commission.463 The
court found no legal or logical flaw, such as the one in Huitt, in
asserting that a defendant had committed the crime of attempted
second-degree sexual assault.' Therefore, the court of appeals
ruled that the crime of attempted second-degree sexual assault
exists in Alaska when, intending to engage in sexual contact with
another person, without regard for that person's lack of consent, a
person takes a substantial step toward accomplishing his goal. 5
In Hansen v. State,466 Hansen appealed his conviction for
felony murder because it was neither charged in the indictment nor
was it a lesser included offense.467 The State claimed that in-
455. 854 P.2d 1130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
456. Id. at 1130-32.
457. 678 P.2d 415 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (holding that attempted second-
degree murder is not a recognizable crime in Alaska).
458. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(a) (1992).
459. Huitt, 678 P.2d at 419.
460. Guertin, 854 P.2d at 1131.
461. Id. at 1132.
462. Id. at 1130 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (1992)).
463. Id. at 1131 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.31.100(a) (1992)).
464. Id. at 1132.
465. Id.
466. 845 P.2d 449 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
467. Id. at 451.
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structing the jury on felony murder was not error because "the
elements of felony murder can be derived by combining selected
elements of the [other] crimes charged in Hansen's indictment."4
The court of appeals disagreed with the State's argument,
stating that it would not expand the doctrine of lesser included
offenses to this extent. 9 The court ruled that allowing the court
to mesh together disjointed elements of an indictment would
stretch "to the breaking point the concept that an indictment must
notify the defendant of the charges to be tried."470
In Woodward v. State,471 the defendant contested his convic-
tion for extortion,472 asserting that the trial court erred by refus-
ing to instruct the jury on Woodward's claim-of-right defense.473
Woodward claimed that he was allowed to use threats to regain his
own money,474 just as a property owner is permitted to use force
in defense of his property. Woodward also argued that his
behavior was not extortion as defined in the applicable statute
because his intended "victim" actually owed him money.475
Therefore, Woodward had not "obtain[ed] the property of
another," as required by the statute.476
The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. First,
the court held that the phrase "property of another" included the
money of Woodward's victim since that victim had a possessory
interest in the funds which Woodward demanded.477 Addressing
the defense of property analogy, the court acknowledged that this
claim-of-right defense was embraced by the Model Penal Code.47
However, the court also observed that recognition of the defense
is clearly the minority view. 479 Moreover, the Alaska Legislature
had expressly rejected any such defense when it adopted the
Revised Code."0
468. Id. at 452.
469. Id. at 453.
470. Id. at 453-54.
471. 855 P.2d 423 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
472. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.520 (1992).
473. Woodward, 855 P.2d at 424.
474. Id.
475. Section 11.41.520(a)(1) reads in relevant part: "(a) A person commits the
crime of extortion if the person obtains the property of another by threatening or
suggesting that either that person or another may (1) inflict physical injury on
anyone .... " ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.520(a)(1) (1992).
476. Woodward, 855 P.2d at 424.
477. Id. at 428.
478. Id. at 425.
479. Id. at 425-26.
480. Id.
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In Green v. State,"' the defendant appealed his conviction on
burglary and theft charges. Green alleged that he should not have
been prosecuted because the police had promised immunit from
prosecution in exchange for return of the stolen property.' The
defendant based his claim on the police's alleged assertion to him
that "this is not a very serious crime. Just tell us where the wallet
is, and you can catch your flight."'
The Alaska Court of Appeals, in upholding Green's conviction,
examined the case law from several other jurisdictions and decided
to "likewise hold that police officers, acting on their own, cannot
enter into a binding immunity or non-prosecution agreement with
a suspect or defendant."'  However, the court also held that
confessions acquired through these improper promises should not
be allowed in as evidence at the trial.' In this case, however,
the trial court had suppressed Green's confession; therefore, no
error existed that would require further relief.4 6
Journey v. State487 was a consolidated case that presented a
single issue on appeal: under what circumstances may courts order
criminal records expunged.' The court of appeals noted that in
Alaska, no rule, statute or court ruling expressly bestows upon
sentencing courts the power to expunge criminal records. 4 9
Therefore, this power, if it is within the court's capacity, must come
from an inherent judicial authority4 0
The court of appeals recognized that the states differ over
whether there is an inherent judicial authority to expunge criminal
records.49 Some states completely deny that such power exists,
while other states take a more flexible approach, weighing the
defendant's constitutional right to privacy against the public's
interest in being able to access public records.49  The court of
appeals noted, however, that in every state which has recognized
such an inherent judicial authority, the power is to be used
sparingly or only in "exceptional circumstances. ' ,41 Finding it
481. 857 P.2d 1197 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
482. Id. at 1197.
483. Id. at 1198.
484. Id. at 1201.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. 850 P.2d 663 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
488. Id.
489. Id. at 665.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 665-66.
493. Id. at 666.
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unnecessary to determine whether Alaska would recognize such an
inherent authority to expunge records, the court simply held that
in neither of the consolidated cases before it were there "exception-
al circumstances" that would justify expunging records.494
VI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided a large number of employ-
ment law cases in 1993. They are divided into four main subsec-
tions: disability causation, disability/impairment determination,
administration of disability claims and miscellaneous non-disability
cases.
A. Disability Causation
Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson495 involved a worker who suf-
fered two serious job-related injuries, one in 1969 and one in 1984,
while working for different employers.4 96 After the second injury,
the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") set aside the
Compromise and Release ("C&R") between the employee and the
first employer.497 The Board determined that the employee was
actually totally and permanently disabled after the first injury,
which, mistakenly, was not reflected in the C&R.498 Thus, the
first employer was held responsible for all future permanent
disability payments to the employee.41 The superior court
affirmed the Board's decision." °
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the power
to modify awards for changed conditions or mistakes of fact ex-
pressed under [Alaska Statutes section 23.30.130] does not,
however, extend to settlements. '50 1
The court also found the Board in error for failing to apply the
last injurious exposure rule to the 1984 injury." According to
the court, the Board's inquiry should have focused on the em-
ployee's most recent work injury when it considered his disability
claim.5° If the most recent injury caused, aggravated, accelerated
or was in some way a substantial factor in the employee's current
inability to work, then the Board should not find a lack of
494. Id.
495. 856 P.2d 1155 (Alaska 1993).
496. Id. at 1156.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1157.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 1158; ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.130 (1990).
502. Olsen, 856 P.2d at 1161.
503. Id.
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causation "merely because a prior injury might also suffice as a
concurrent cause of the employee's current disability."5°4 The
case was remanded with orders to the Board to determine
causation consistent with the court's opinion50
Peek v. SKW/Clinton" involved the use of the last injurious
exposure rule as a defense. An employee's widow brought suit
against her husband's many employers, claiming that his death was
caused by exposure to asbestos." After ten of the former
employers settled with the plaintiff, including the husband's last
employer,508 the Workers' Compensation Board dismissed the
claim against the second-to-last employer, citing the last injurious
exposure rule.50
In objecting to the dismissal, the employee's widow argued that
the rule is meant to be a weapon for an employee, not a shield for
an employer. 10 The court rejected her argument and held that
where "the last employer was at one time properly before the
adjudicating authority, but is later removed from the case by a
voluntary act of the worker, the worker cannot avoid application
of the last exposure rule. 51'
Childs v. Copper Valley Electric Ass'n512 involved an employ-
ee who claimed that a chronic breathing disorder was caused by
urethane smoke that he inhaled on the job 3 The employee
sued for temporary total disability benefits ("TID"), permanent
partial disability benefits ("PPD") and attorney's fees. 1 4 He also
sought medical expenses (plus interest) that his employer, Copper
Valley Electric Association ("CVEA"), had offered to pay for but
did not.15 Furthermore, he contended that CVEA owed him a
penalty for failure to pay the medical expenses as promised.5 6
The court first concluded that CVEA successfully rebutted the
presumption of compensability.517  The court rejected the em-
ployee's argument that the medical experts had to offer alternative
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. 855 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1993).
507. Id. at 416.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 418.
512. 860 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1993).
513. Id. at 1186.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id
517. Id. at 1189.
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explanations for his breathing disorder. 18 It was enough that the
medical experts determined that the work-related smoke inhalation
was most likely not a substantial cause."
The court next rejected the employee's argument that CVEA
had failed to meet the substantial evidence burden because one of
its expert witnesses did not even examine him, but only studied his
medical records.5 20 The court noted that this witness' opinion did
not stand alone.52 Thus, the opinion of this witness, coupled with
testimony from an expert witness who did examine the employee,
constituted substantial evidence supporting the view that the injury
was not work-related 5 z
The court also ruled that CVEA's voluntary payment of some
of the employee's initial medical bills and TTD benefits did not
equitably estop CVEA from denying further liability.5'z The
court did not want to discourage employers from voluntarily
helping injured workers.524
Finally, with respect to the unpaid medical expenses, since the
offer of payment for such expenses was tantamount to a Board
award, the court held that the employee was entitled to interest and
attorney's fees on the promised, but unpaid, portion. 5 More-
over, the court interpreted the word "compensation" in Alaska
Statutes sections 23.30.155(b) and (e) to include medical bene-
fits. 26 Thus, the court held that CVEA should have been as-
sessed a penalty (set forth in subsection (e)) of twenty percent of
the promised, but unpaid, medical expenses.527
B. Disability/Impairment Determination
In Rydwell v. Anchorage School District,528 the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that the American Medical Associa-
tion's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
("Guides"), which are statutorily required for determinations of
permanent partial impairment compensation,529 also control
determinations of permanent impairment and eligibility for
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 1189-90.
523. Id. at 1190.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 1192; ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155 (1990).
527. Childs, 860 P.2d at 1192.
528. 864 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).
529. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.190(b) (1990).
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vocational rehabilitation.3 The court held that section 23.30.190-
(b) did govern such determinations under section 23.30.041(f)-(3).531 The court's holding affirmed a reversal of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Board. 3
An employee is not eligible for vocational rehabilitation
benefits if "at the time of medical stability no permanent impair-
ment is identified or expected. 533 In the present case, although
the employee suffered from a measurable physical impairment,"
the impairment translated into a zero permanent impairment rating
under the AMA's Guides.35 This was the crux of the case.
The court noted that section 23.30.041, which governs the
award of vocational rehabilitation rights, does not define "perma-
nent impairment."536 The only other statutory section in which
the term is found, section 23.30.190(b), prescribes the use of the
AMA's Guides to determine a permanent partial impairment,3 7
but does not indicate the Guides' applicability to the rest of the
Workers' Compensation Act. 38
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the legislature intended
"permanent impairment" to mean the same thing in both code
sections.539 The court also found that its interpretation of "per-
manent impairment" in determinations of vocational rehabilitation
eligibility would mesh with the overall workers' compensation
benefit scheme intended by the legislature."4 The court noted
that if an impairment which registered zero under the AMA's
Guides could nonetheless be termed a "permanent impairment,"
that would run contrary to the legislature's goals of predictability,
objectivity and cost-reduction.5 41
Yahara v. Construction & Rigging, Inc,542 reaffirmed the pro-
priety of the Board's reliance on a single physician's testimony to
support its decision to award reemployment benefits under Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.041.' 43 Two physicians and an occupational
530. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(f)(3) (1990).
531. Rydwell, 864 P.2d at 526.
532. Id. at 528.
533. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(f)(3) (1990).
534. Rydwell, 864 P.2d at 529.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.190(b) (1990).
538. Rydwell, 864 P.2d at 529.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 529-30.
541. Id.
542. 851 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1993).
543. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041 (1990).
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therapist offered conflicting testimony at the hearing.' One
physician and the therapist believed that the employee could
resume working at his old job. 45 The court disregarded the
occupational therapist because she was not a physician, as required
under section 23.30.041.46 The court then affirmed the Board's
decision to award benefits on the testimony of the contrariant
physician. 7  The court noted that the Board's decision would
always be affirmed when it elected one physician's opinion over
another as long as the opinion constituted substantial evidence.54
Since it was reasonable to infer that the contrariant physician relied
on his own training, experience and knowledge of the employee's
condition, it fulfilled the substantial evidence test.s49
C. Administration of Disability Claims
Anchorage School District v. Hale5 0 held that the Board's
promulgation of a single standard of treatment frequency to apply
to all ailments satisfied its statutory mandate to "'adopt regulations
establishing standards for frequency of treatment."' 5 ' Hale, an
employee injured on the job, argued that the Board was required
to set forth many frequency standards for varied job-related inju-
ries."
Looking to the legislative history, the court determined that
while the legislature hoped that the Board would calculate different
standards based on type of injury, it did not require the Board to
do so.553 Therefore, the court held that "the single standard
regulation [was] not inconsistent with the statute."54
In Wausau Insurance. Co. v. Van Biene,55 5 Mrs. Van Biene's
husband was killed during the course and scope of his employ-
ment.556 The employer's workers' compensation insurer, Wausau,
indicated to Mrs. Van Biene (both orally and in writing) that her
insurance benefits would be decreased if she was also receiving
544. Yahara, 851 P.2d at 71.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 73.
547. Id.
548. Id. at 72.
549. Id. at 73.
550. 857 P.2d 1186 (Alaska 1993).
551. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(c) (1990).
552. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 857 P.2d at 1189.
553. Id. at 1190-91.
554. Id. at 1191.
555. 847 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1993).
556. Id.
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social security survivor benefits.57 Mrs. Van Biene never re-
sponded to Wausau's subsequent request for information that
would allow it to obtain data from the Social Security Administra-
tion 558
Three years later Mrs. Van Biene asked Wausau to send a
summary of her insurance benefits to a mortgage company. 9
Wausau responded with a letter that did not mention either the
possible social security offset or the right to be reimbursed by Mrs.
Van Biene for past overpayments. 6
One year later, Wausau repeatedly asked Mrs. Van Biene's
attorney for information concerning the possible receipt of social
security benefits."' After the attorney failed to respond, 62
Wausau finally subpoenaed the information from the Social
Security Administration.
The Social Security Administration verified that Mrs. Van
Biene had been receiving social security benefits all along.5"
Wausau subsequently petitioned the Board to order that payments
to Mrs. Van Biene be reduced to offset both her past and future
social security benefits.65 The Board ruled that Wausau, through
inaction, had waived its rights to both past and future offsets.'
On appeal, the court concluded that the Board had the
authority to invoke equitable principles to preclude a workers'
compensation insurer from asserting statutory rights. 67 Nonethel-
ess, the court reversed the Board's decision568 on the ground that
Wausau's behavior did not amount to an express or implied waiver
of its rights to a setoff. 69 The court found it significant that Mrs.
Van Biene was notified of the setoff possibility both orally and in
writing and therefore could not have been prejudiced when Wausau
finally took action 7
557. Id. at 584-85.
558. Id. at 585.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 585-86.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 586-87.
568. Id. at 589.
569. Id.
570. Id.
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D. Miscellaneous Non-Disability Cases
In Kodiak Island Borough v. State,"71 the Alaska Supreme
Court invalidated the Kodiak Island Borough's 1980 resolution to
opt out of the 1972 Public Employment Relations Act ("PE-
RA").572 The court based its rejection on the fact that the Bor-
ough did not resolve to reject PERA until after it discovered
activity by its employees directed toward unionization.573 The
court rejected the Borough's attempt to distinguish State v. City of
Petersburg,574 holding instead that Petersburg invalidated any
rejection of PERA which occurred after the local government
became aware that its employees had begun substantial organizing
activities.575 Since the Borough opted out of PERA under those
circumstances, the court invalidated the rejection.576
In Breck v. State Department of Labor,577 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that "corporate officers who exercise significant
control over a corporation's finances may be held personally liable
for the entire [employment security] contribution owed by the
corporation" under the Alaska Employment Act.578 Under the
Act, employers must pay employment security contributions to the
State based on the wages paid to employees.579 Both the employ-
er and the employee pay a portion of the contributions.580
The court noted that the Act does not distinguish between the
employer and employee portions of the required contribution.
Instead, the whole amount due is collectible from the responsible
corporate officers and employees.""
Moreover, the court did not find the Act's reach to be overl
broad since it does not hold every officer or employee liable.5Z3
The only personally liable officers are those whose duty it is to see
that the contributions are paid on behalf of the corporation.
As president, chief executive officer and principal shareholder of
571. 853 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1993).
572. Id. at 1111-12; ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070-.260 (1990).
573. Kodiak Island Borough, 853 P.2d at 1112.
574. 538 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1975).
575. Kodiak Island Borough, 853 P.2d at 1114.
576. Id.
577. 862 P.2d 854 (Alaska 1993).
578. Breck, 862 P.2d at 855.
579. ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.165 (1990).
580. Id.
581. Breck, 862 P.2d at 856.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
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his corporation, Mr. Breck was found to satisfy the test." The
other litigant in this consolidated case, who was president, director
and majority shareholder of his company, also met the test.586
VII. FAMILY LAW
In 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court decided many cases in the
area of family law. These cases are divided according to their
principal issues: child support and custody, paternity and property
division.
A. Custody and Child Support
In Wright v. Gregorio,587 the supreme court held that if a
child resides with a parent for a period specified in writing then
that parent has shared physical custody regardless of the status of
legal custody.51 The court determined that the trial court had
failed to take this rule into account when computing child support
obligations. 589 Shared custody formulas should have been used
unless the trial court found that "either party presented clear and
convincing evidence that the formula's application would have led
to manifest injustice."5" Because the lower court had not made
specific factual findings as to the income of the parties involved and
the resulting child support obligations, the lower court's decision
was reversed and remanded.59
Eagley v. Eagley59 addressed an appeal from the superior
court's determination of income for the purpose of calculating child
support."9 Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3, which governs
the calculation of adjusted income in child support determina-
tions, 94 defines adjusted annual income as "'the parent's total
income from all sources' minus specified items." 5  The court
previously has held that such a broad definition gives the superior
court discretion in determining whether amounts voluntarily
deposited in deferred income compensation accounts should be
585. Id. at 857.
586. Id.
587. 855 P.2d 772 (Alaska 1993).
588. Id. at 773 (citing ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(0 (period specified in writing
must be at least 30% of the year)).
589. Id.
590. Id. at 774.
591. Id.
592. 849 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993).
593. Id. at 778.
594. Id. at 779.
595. Id. (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)).
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included in calculating income.596 The court also has held that "a
child support award will not be overturned absent a finding of clear
abuse of discretion."'  Applying these standards, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the superior court did not err in including
accrued but unpaid interest in its calculation of income.9 8
The court did hold that a deduction for straight-line deprecia-
tion of a business's real estate should be allowed, as long as the
depreciation does not contain any acceleration.599 This qualifica-
tion was made in response to the rather liberal IRS rules allowing
for inclusion of accelerated components in depreciation expens-
es.' Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in denying deduction of principal
payments.601
In TM.C. v. S.A.C.,6 the supreme court upheld the trial
court's sua sponte finding that a change of circumstances required
the award of sole custody of the couple's daughter to the moth-
er.' 3  Soon after the divorce, the father sought modification of
the trial court's custody order, alleging changed circumstances
required an award of sole custody to him.' Instead of finding
the changed circumstances alleged by the father, however, the court
found some changed circumstances existed "with regard to the
ability of the parents to communicate and make decisions togeth-
er," and awarded sole custody to the mother.' 5
On appeal, the court examined whether a trial court, on its
own motion, can find a change of circumstances in a child custody
case. The court held that "the trial court may decide [such]
issues on its own motion, as long as a party has raised them and
both sides have the opportunity to present full testimony."' The
mother's brief included a changed circumstances argument, putting
the father on notice that she would make the argument.60s Fur-
thermore, at the evidentiary hearing, the father was given full
596. Id. (citing Bergstrom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska 1989)).
597. Id. at n. 1 (quoting Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1216 (Alaska
1989)).
598. Id. at 780.
599. Id. at 781.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 782.
602. 858 M.2d 315 (Alaska 1993).
603. Id. at 316.
604. Id. at 316-17.
605. Id. at 317.
606. Id. at 318.
607. Id. at 318-19.
608. Id. at 319.
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opportunity to present his evidence and argue the merits of the
case.
609
The court held in In Re J.B.K and T.S.K.61 that a remarriage
following some years of divorce renders previous periods of
nonsupport irrelevant in determining whether there had been a
forfeiture of parental rights.6 ' The natural father had failed to
provide support for two years after the first divorce." 2 Since that
time, however, the couple reconciled, remarried and then subse-
quently divorced for a second time.613 The court reasoned the
remarriage should be treated as a "renewal of their rights and
obligations as parents." '614 Therefore, "[d]isputes over custody
and child support existing between the parties prior to the
remarriage should be put to rest as well. 615
The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case on other
grounds, however. The court held that the trial court erred in
denying a hearing on the natural father's alleged abuse of his
children.616 In so holding, the supreme court rejected the father's
claims that a Child in Need of Aid ("CINA") adjudication must
precede adoption proceedings when parental rights are to be
terminated under Alaska Statutes section 25.23.180(c)(1).617
In ET v. State,6 8 the court reversed the trial court's order
placing a child in the custody of the Department of Family Services
("DFYS"). 1  First, the court noted that the State had confused
"willingness to care" with "ability to satisfy needs.""62 A finding
that the parents cannot solve all the problems of a child with severe
emotional difficulties does not support a conclusion that there is no
willingness to care for the child."
609. Id.
610. 865 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1993).
611. Id. at 738. This issue became the subject of litigation when the mother's
new husband brought adoption proceedings for custody of his step-children.
Under Alaska Statutes section 25.23.050 (a)(2), a parent's consent to adoption is
not required if the parent significantly fails for at least one year to provide care
and support for the child. This one-year period need not be the year immediately
preceding the adoption petition. See In re J.J.J., 178 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986).
612. In re J.B.K., 865 P.2d at 737.
613. Id.
614. Id. at 739.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 740.
617. Id. The provision authorizes the court to terminate parental rights in
adoption proceedings on grounds including child abuse.
618. 862 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1993).
619. Id. at 859.
620. Id. at 861.
621. Id.
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The court also reversed the trial court's finding that there
would be "imminent and substantial harm" if the child were placed
with the father.6' The trial court's conclusion was based on
judicial notice of previous domestic violence restraining orders.623
Unlike a fact proven at trial, the court reasoned, a fact alleged in
a restraining order is subject to reasonable dispute.624 Thus, it
was error for the court to take judicial notice of the orders for the
purpose of proving a history of violence.6"
B. Paternity
In Smith v. Smith,626 the supreme court adopted the long-
standing common law rule that a child born to a married woman is
presumed to be the offspring of her husband.627 The court also
ruled that the superior court's failure to indicate the standard of
proof it required to rebut the presumption of paternity mandated
remand for a determination of whether the husband overcame the
presumptions of paternity.6'
In Wright v. Black, 9 Wright claimed he was given inade-
quate notice that his motion for paternity testing would be
considered at the child support hearing. 3 Such inadequate
notice, he asserted, violated his constitutional right to due process
of law under the Alaska Constitution.63 The court acknowledged
that Wright was not told until the hearing began that paternity
would be addressed.632 The court found, however, that Wright
failed to preserve his right to appeal since he failed to object at the
hearing when the Divorce Master asked if anyone had a problem
with addressing both issues.633 The court held that "even a pro
se litigant must make some attempt to assert his or her rights."634
622. Id. at 862.
623. Id. at 863.
624. Id. at 863-64.
625. Id. at 864.
626. 845 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1993).
627. Id. at 1092.
628. Smith, 845 P.2d at 1092-93. The scientific presumption found in Alaska
Statutes section 25.20.050(d) also implicated the husband. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.-
050(d) (1991) ("A scientifically accepted procedure that establishes a probability
of parentage at 95 percent or higher creates a presumption of parentage that may
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.").
629. 856 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1993).
630. Id. at 478.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 480.
633. Id.
634. Id.
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Moreover, the court dismissed Wright's claims that he should
not have been estopped from denying paternity.635 For determi-
nations of the applicability of equitable estoppel, the court adopted
the standards set forth in Clevenger v. Clevenger, a California
case.636 As the Clevenger standards were met in this case, the
court held that estoppel was appropriate.637
C. Property Division
The Alaska Supreme Court in Olson v. Olson638 held that
loss of employment after entry of a divorce decree did not
constitute sufficient grounds for modifying the decree under Alaska
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2), (5), and/or (6).639 The
court first ruled that termination of employment, although
unexpected, did not constitute surprise under the meaning of Rule
60(b)(1), which covers only events that occur prior to the entry of
judgment.' The court likewise denied the Rule 60(b)(2) motion
because "newly discovered evidence" must "relate to facts which
were in existence at the time of the trial."'" The court denied
the Rule 60(b)(5) motion because other components of the
property settlement prevented the sudden termination of employ-
ment from placing the appellant in "an inferior economic position"
to his ex-spouse or making the distribution of assets "any more
inequitable than [they] already [were]." 2  Finally, the supreme
court concluded that it would not grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion
without evidence that the underlying assumptions of the dissolution
agreement had been destroyed, as required by Clauson v. Clau-
son. 
643
In Keffer v. Keffer,6 the court held that a dissolution agree-
ment excluding "[i]income earned outside of primary place of
635. Id. at 481 (citing cases from Florida, Michigan and Montana).
636. Id. at 481 (citing Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961)). The standards for equitable estoppel are as follows:
(1) [r]epresentation (direct or implied) of husband to child that he is the
father; (2) husband intended his representation to be accepted and acted
on by the child; (3) child relied on the representation and treated
husband as father and gave his love and affection to husband; and (4)
child was ignorant of the true facts.
Clevenger, 11 Cal Rptr. at 714.
637. Wright, 856 P.2d at 481.
638. 856 P.2d 482 (Alaska 1993).
639. Id.
640. Id. at 484.
641. Id. (quoting Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169, 177 (Alaska 1966)).
642. Id. at 485.
643. Id. (citing Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992)).
644. 852 P.2d 394 (Alaska 1993).
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employment" does not include retirement benefits."45  The
appellant accepted an early retirement opportunity and ceased
support payments;646 the superior court reasoned that such a
"voluntary retirement" did not exempt appellant from paying
support.64
The supreme court reversed, concluding that its power was
limited by the term "primary place of employment."' ' The court
dismissed concerns about the breadth of the appellant's control
over the payments by noting his control remained limited by the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.649 Since the
appellant's acceptance of early retirement did not constitute bad
faith, the court held there was no obligation to continue support
payments.65
In Root v. Root,"1 the supreme court held that a non-vested
pension is marital property subject to division.652 The court
stated that the best approach is to insist that the parties come
forward with evidence detailing the present value of those bene-
fits.653 If the pension does vest, then the value at the time of the
divorce can be divided.654
VIII. FISH AND GAME LAW
In 1993, the Alaska Court of Appeals and the Alaska Supreme
Court decided three cases concerning fish and game law. The first
case addressed the consequences of ambiguous orders; the second
addressed several issues concerning fines; and the third dealt with
the transferability of fishing permits. Each will be discussed in
turn.
In State v. Martushev,655 the Alaska Court of Appeals upheld
an emergency order issued by the Department of Fish and Game
against a due process claim of vagueness. The emergency order
had authorized a temporary extension of a weekly fishing period in
a limited area for a limited time.656 Boundaries had been set out
645. Id. at 398.
646. Id. at 396.
647. Id. at 398.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 398-99.
651. 851 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1993).
652. Id. at 68.
653. Id. at 69.
654. 1&
655. 846 P.2d 144 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
656. Id. at 146.
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in the order in reference to a man-made landmark.61 7 A commer-
cial fisherman who was charged with fishing outside of a regulated
area argued the order was void for vagueness since it did not
specify the actual latitude of the boundary.65
The court rejected the challenge, holding that the defendant
failed to meet the burden of proof.6" It was not enough to show
that the order could have been better defined. Rather, the
defendant affirmatively must have shown that "he did not know
and could not have learned, through reasonable inquiry, the
location of [the boundary]."' The fisherman failed to meet the
burden because he could not show (1) that the latitude of the
manmade object was unpublished, (2) that he made reasonable
efforts to determine the object's location, and (3) that he subjec-
tively and reasonably believed his conduct was legal.66' Accord-
ing to the court, the regulated nature of commercial fishing
imposed a special duty on commercial fishermen to comply with
the regulations.662
In McNabb v. State,66' the court of appeals rejected the
plaintiff's charge that the ordered forfeiture amount was exorbi-
tant.6  McNabb was charged with violating a law prohibiting the
use of non-pelagic trawl gear within the waters of King Crab
Registration Area M.665  Pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
16.05.723(a),666 the sentencing court ordered him to pay a forfei-
ture of $39,758.40, an amount equal to the fair market value of all
the fish on board his boat on the day of the alleged violation.667
657. Id.
658. Id. at 148.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 150.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. 860 P.2d 1294 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
664. Id. at 1297.
665. Id. at 1296.
666. The subsection 16.05.723(a) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The court shall order forfeiture of any fish, or its fair market value, taken
or retained as a result of the commission of the violation. . . . For
purposes of this subsection, it is a rebuttable presumption that all fish
found on board a fishing vessel used in or in aid of a violation, or found
at the fishing site, were taken or retained in violation of [Alaska Statutes
sections] 16.05.440-16.05.690 or a commercial fisheries regulation of the
Board of Fisheries or the department, and it is the defendant's burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that fish on board or at the site
were lawfully taken and retained.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.723(a) (1992).
667. McNabb, 860 P.2d at 1296.
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Although McNabb received $39,758.40 for fish caught on four
separate tows that day, he was convicted only for the fourth tow,
as charges regarding the first three tows had been dismissed.'
The court of appeals reversed this result, finding Alaska Statutes
section 16.05.723(a) to be ambiguous and construing the section to
provide for forfeiture only of fish taken or retained as a result of
the acts for which McNabb was convicted. 9
In addition to the forfeiture, the sentencing court imposed a
fine of $39,758.40 pursuant to section 16.05.723(b), 67' of which the
court suspended $20,000.00.671 McNabb contended the additional
fine was improper because it exceeded the value of the fish taken
in the tow for which he was convicted.' The court of appeals
disagreed, finding the rule under subsection (a) and subsection (b)
to differ. It held that the size of the fine imposed under subsection
(b) did not depend on the amount of fish taken as a result of the
crime.' Rather, the subsection imposes a fine based on the
value of all fish found aboard a vessel, whether or not they were
taken illegally.674
Moreover, the court held the fine imposed against McNabb
was not grossly disproportionate to the crime, and, as such, not
violative of the United States or Alaska constitutions.675 The
court of appeals did remand the case to determine the appropriate
forfeiture amount in light of the former Alaska Statutes section
12.55.035(a),676 however, as the sentencing court had failed to
"take into account the financial resources of the defendant." 6" In
Pavone v. Pavone,67 the Alaska Supreme Court declared unen-
forceable an oral promise to transfer a fishing permit. Under
Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(g)(2), "an entry permit may not
be . . . transferred with any retained right of repossession or
foreclosure, or on any condition requiring a subsequent trans-
fer."679  The court noted that when legislation explicitly states
668. Id. at 1296-97.
669. Id.
670. Under subsection 16.05.723(b), a court may impose "a fine equal to the
gross value of the fish found on board ... at the time of the violation." ALASKA
STAT. § 16.05.723(b) (1992).
671. McNabb, 860 P.2d at 1296.
672. Id. at 1298.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 1299.
676. Id.
677. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(a) (1990).
678. 860 P.2d 1228 (Alaska 1993).
679. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(g)(2) (1990).
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that a particular type of promise is unenforceable, then the party
seeking to enforce the promise will have no judicial recourse.'
IX. NATIVE LAW
The 1993 Alaska Supreme Court cases turning on the interpre-
tation of Native Law implicated the Indian Child Welfare Act.
K.N. v. State"1 clarified the burden of proof requirements for
termination of parental rights over a Native child. The DFYS must
prove, among other things:
by a preponderance of the evidence that the party requesting the
termination of parental rights has shown that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the break-up of the Indian family
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.'
K.N. argued the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA")M preempts
the CINA rule and requires DFYS to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that active remedial efforts had been unsuccessful.' K.N.
argued precedent from other jurisdictions and "the fundamental
purpose of ICWA-to prevent the breakup of Indian fami-
lies"--compelled the higher burden of proof. The Alaska Su-
preme Court was unpersuaded, however, and concluded the plain
language of the statute and relevant legislative history required
only an affirmative showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that active efforts by the State to keep the family together
failed. 6  The court held that the State had satisfied such a
burden.'
In In re EH.,' the Native Village of Noatak and DFYS op-
posed the adoption of a Native child by a non-Native couple.69
The ICWA provides that unless there is good cause to the contrary,
"preference shall be given.., to a placement with (1) a member
of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families."6"
The court found four factors which constituted good cause to
deviate from the ICWA preferences. First, the biological mother
680. Pavone, 860 P.2d at 1231-32.
681. 856 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1993).
682. C.I.N.A. R. P. 18(c)(2); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1983) (emphasis added).
683. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1978).
684. K.N. v. State, 856 P.2d at 475.
685. Id. at 476.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 477.
688. 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
689. Id. at 1362.
690. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1983).
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preferred that the non-Native couple adopt F.H"9 The court
noted that the ICWA and guidelines put forth by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs both indicate that parental preference may be
considered by courts."9 Second, there was a bond developing
between the prospective mother and EH.69 Third, the child's
situation would be uncertain if the adoption were denied. 94
Fourth, the adoption by the non-Native couple would be an open
one where the biological mother could more easily visit the
child.695
X. PROCEDURE
Alaska Courts often face procedural questions intermixed with
substantive issues as cases rise to the appellate level. The past year
was no exception. A strong strand of procedural issues can be
distinguished in the cases that follow, however. The case summa-
ries are divided into four categories: attorney's fees, statute of
limitations, discovery and miscellaneous.
A. Attorney's Fees
In Singh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,696
the Alaska Supreme Court clarified the standards under which
attorney's fees should be awarded to a civil rights litigant who
settles the lawsuit before trial. The 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, which governs the award of attorney's fees, reads
in relevant part: "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.",69
The court held that a plaintiff who enters into a settlement
agreement must meet two requirements to prove that he is the
"prevailing party." First, "the plaintiff's suit must have caused the
plaintiffs achievement of his desired goal in the litigation. 698
This requirement was easily met in this case, since the plaintiffs
suit resulted in a settlement for money damages.699 Second, "the
claim forming the basis of section 1988 fees must not 'lack
691. F.H., 851 P.2d at 1364-65.
692. Id. at 1364.
693. Id. at 1365.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. 860 P.2d 1193 (Alaska 1993).
697. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1992).
698. Singh, 860 P.2d at 1198.
699. Id.
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colorable merit."' 7  The plaintiff alleged racial discrimination in
violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981 in State Farm's refusal to pursue
a fair settlement earlier.7"' Section 1981 reads in pertinent part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts."7' Since it is well established that a settlement agree-
ment is a contract, the court concluded the plaintiff pled a
colorable section 1981 claim. 3
The court then examined the reasonableness of the attorney's
fees. Singh had settled for $17,501 and claimed $31,920 in
attorney's fees.7' The superior court reduced the amount of
fees.705 The supreme court concluded the overall complexity of
civil rights litigation and the degree of success achieved by Singh's
attorney justified his attorney's fees claim.7 6 Since awarding full
attorney's fees is the norm under section 1988 if they are reason-
able, the court found that the superior court abused its discretion
by not awarding the full amount.W The court also rejected State
Farm's argument that awarded fees could not be greater than
settlement damages.0 8
B. Statute of Limitations
In Hernandez-Robaina v. State,70 9 the plaintiff, who was origi-
nally from Cuba and under the supervision of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, had been held in federal custody because of
a damaging psychiatric evaluation written while he was in state
custody on trespassing charges.710 Hernandez wished to sue the
State of Alaska, the municipality of Anchorage, and the psychiatrist
for his improper detention, but the defendants moved to dismiss on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run and on sovereign
immunity.7 ' The plaintiff argued his inability to understand
700. Id. (quoting Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1152-53
(5th Cir. 1985)).
701. Id.
702. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
703. Singh, 860 P.2d at 1199.
704. Id. at 1196-97.
705. Id. at 1197.
706. Id. at 1200-01.
707. Id.
708. Id. at 1202 (citing City of Riverside v. Riveria, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986)
(upholding an award of $245,456.25 in attorney's fees where the damages award
was only $33,350)).
709. 849 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1993).
710. Id. at 783.
711. Id. at 784.
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English made him incompetent, tolling the statute of limita-
tions.712 On appeal, the supreme court held that the statute of
limitations was not tolled, reasoning it should be suspended on
incompetency grounds only when a plaintiff is unable to understand
his legal rights.713 The court ruled that the incompetency excep-
tion concerned a person's mental capacity to understand, not his
actual understanding of, his rights, and therefore the exception
should not apply if the petitioner could have understood his rights
once properly communicated to him.1
C. Discovery
In McNett v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,715 the Alaska Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow a deposition
prior to the filing of an action.7 6 McNett filed a petition to
depose a witness under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 27(a)717
before she filed an action.718 McNett stated that she needed
more information before she could bring an action for breach of
contract and wrongful termination.7 9 The trial court refused
McNett's petition and awarded attorney's fees to Alyeska.720
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court considered
authorities on the equivalent federal rule,2 which hold that the
discovery rule is not to be used to determine whether a cause of
action exists.7' The party wishing to conduct discovery before
filing an action must show that it expects to bring a lawsuit but is
unable to do so until he has gained more facts. 72
The court found that McNett failed to show specific reasons
for her inability to bring an action at the time of her discovery
712. Id. at 783.
713. Id. at 785; ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140(a)(2) (1992) (tolls statute of
limitations for persons "incompetent by reason of mental illness or mental
disability").
714. Hernandez, 849 P.2d at 784-85.
715. 856 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1993).
716. Id. at 1166.
717. Rule 27 states that before an action is brought, "[a] person who desires to
perpetuate... testimony.., of another person regarding any matter that may
properly be the subject of an action or proceeding in any court of the state, may
file a verified petition in the superior court." ALASKA R. CIv. P. 27(a).
718. McNett, 856 P.2d at 1166.
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. The court decided such analysis was proper since the state rule was based
on the federal rule. Id. at 1168 n.2 (citing Fenner v. Bassett, 412 P.2d 318, 321
(Alaska 1966)).
722. Id. at 1168 (citing In Re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D.D.C. 1978)).
723. Id.
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petition.724 Furthermore, the court rejected McNett's claim that
the state rule should be interpreted in light of Alaska's unique
location.7' The court held McNett's relocating outside of Alaska
did not invoke state discovery procedures analogous to federal
procedures used when a witness is preparing to leave the United
States.7
26
In Heppinstall v. Darnall Kemna & Co., Inc.,727 the supreme
court reversed the trial court's ruling that it lacked the jurisdiction
to enforce post-judgment discovery. Because the defendant neither
filed a stay on appeal nor presented a bond required to suspend the
trial court's judgment,7' the trial court could compel discovery in
supervising the execution of judgment under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 69(a).729 Moreover, the supreme court found that
Alaska's Civil Rule 37 makes no pre- or post-judgment distinctions
in allowing a trial court to compel discovery.73 The court rea-
soned if such distinctions werepermitted, it would make discovery
under Civil Rule 69(a) hollow."'
D. Miscellaneous
In Christiansen v. Melinda,73 2 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that power of attorney does not authorize an agent to bring a pro
se civil action for the principal he represents.7 3 Christiansen filed
suit against the State and the Deputy Clerk of Court for refusing
to honor his power of attorney and failing to file the earlier civil
action.3 The superior court dismissed the action against the
724. Id. at 1169.
725. Id.
726. Id. at 1168.
727. 851 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1993).
728. Id. at 79.
729. Id. at 80; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 69(a) (execution of discovery).
730. Heppinstall, 851 P.2d at 80; ALAsKA R. CIV. P. 37 (order of discovery).
731. Heppinstall, 851 P.2d at 80.
732. 857 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1993).
733. Id. at 345-46.
734. Christiansen, 857 P.2d at 346. Christiansen filed the suit under Alaska
Statutes section 13.26.353(c), which provides:
A third party shall honor the terms of a properly executed statutory form
power of attorney. A third party who fails to honor a properly executed
statutory form power of attorney may be liable in a civil action to the
principal, the attorney-in-fact, or the principal's heirs, assigns or estate for
a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000, plus the actual damages, costs, and
fees associated with the failure to comply with the statutory form power
of attorney. The civil action shall be the exclusive remedy at law for
damages.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.353(c) (1992).
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State.735 The supreme court affirmed, stating that only licensed
attorneys can practice law; therefore an unlicensed agent cannot
bring a pro se action unless he is already a licensed attorney-at-
law.736
XI. PROPERTY LAW
In 1993, Alaska courts decided a wide variety of property law
cases ranging from a number of cases dealing with takings of
property to adverse possession.
A. Takings
In Zerbetz v. Municipality of Anchorage,73 7 the Alaska Su-
preme Court ruled that the designation of property as "conserva-
tion wetlands" by the Municipality of Anchorage did not constitute
a regulatory taking and that ample evidence supported the jury's
determination that the construction of the North Klatt Road
Extension by the Municipality did not result in a physical invasion
of the property."
The property owner argued that the superior court improperly
bifurcated its suit into a regulatory takings claim and a physical
takings claim, as opposed to a single "cumulative" taking. 3 The
supreme court found the bifurcation proper because the water
invasion caused by the road extension was completely unrelated to
the "conservation wetlands" designation.740 The supreme court
also determined there was no concrete evidence that the owner was
deprived of the economic advantages of ownership by the designa-
tion of its property as conservation wetlands. 1 The property
could still be developed under the Anchorage Coastal Management
Plan.742 The owner's reliance on tax assessments to show dimin-
ished value also was misplaced, as the court deemed such assess-
ments to be unreliable and as bearing no relationship to fair market
value.743
735. Christiansen, 857 P.2d at 346.
736. Id at 348. The court stated that the definition of "practice of law" in
Alaska Statutes section 08.08.210(a) encompasses in-court representation as found
in this case. I&. at 347.
737. 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993).
738. Id. at 778.
739. Id. at 782.
740. Id.
741. Id. at 783.
742. Id.
743. Id.
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In Anchorage v. Sandberg,'" the supreme court ruled that
certain actions taken by the Municipality of Anchorage did not
amount to a taking of the plaintiff's property by inverse condemna-
tion. The municipality originally had assessed the plaintiffs'
property with districts that would provide water and sewage
necessary to develop the area.74 The municipality later pur-
chased the land bordering the plaintiff's property on three sides,
rendering the districting plan economically unadvantageous.7
The court noted that State Department of Natural Resources v.
Arctic Slope Regional Corp.747 established three factors to be
considered in determining whether governmental action amounts
to a taking. First, the court considered the character of the
governmental action involved. 4  The court found the case
involved neither a physical invasion nor a regulation constraining
the plaintiff's use of the property.7 49 "Instead, it involves a series
of municipal decisions which, indirectly, have rendered [the]
development plans economically infeasible."75"
Second, the court considered whether the government action
produced a severe economic impact. The court recognized that "it
has now become economically infeasible for [Sandberg] to develop
its land in part due to the municipality's change of plans."7s5 Due
to the lack of any "direct restrictions" on Sandberg's property,
however, the court could not find a taking from this condition
alone.752
Third, the court turned to the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
expectations in developing the land and whether they should be
constitutionally protected.75 3  The court reasoned Sandberg's
purchase of the land was "not evidence of reasonable investment-
backed expectation, but rather, a business gamble. 75 4 The court
also reasoned the government had a legitimate interest in promot-
ing its financial stability, allowing the government to change its
position "for fiscal reasons after improvement districts are ap-
proved."55
744. 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993).
745. Id. at 555.
746. Id. at 556.
747. 834 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1991).
748. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557-58.
749. Id. at 558.
750. Id.
751. Id. at 559.
752. Id.
753. Id.
754. Id. at 560.
755. Id. at 561.
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City of Kenai v. Burnett7 6 also involved an inverse condem-
nation action. The supreme court held that a right of first refusal
does not rise to the constructive possession of property required for
a taking to exist. 7 The action was brought against the city for
its taking of a segment of road, known as the Candlelight Exten-
sion, for the construction of a public golf course.758 The lower
court determined that the taking occurred on the date the first lots
on the proposed golf course were leased, and that damages should
be calculated based on that date. 9 At that point, however, the
lessor only had a right of first refusal on the lot which contained
the Candlelight Extension.760 The supreme court held that "the
taking occurred when it became clear that Candlelight Extension
was slated for destruction[J" and remanded the case for determina-
tion of that date.761
The court also examined the method by which the damages
were calculated. The damages were determined according to a
before-and-after fair market valuation of the remaining proper-
ty.62 The city argued an instruction should have been given on
the "cost to cure" damage remedy.76 The supreme court saw
"no reason why an alternative 'cost to cure' instruction need be
given in the absence of a showing by the city that 'fair market
value' is an inaccurate measure of the losses suffered by the
Burnetts. ', 7
64
Additionally, the supreme court remanded on the issue of the
"before" fair market value of the property, which should have
reflected the enhanced value provided by the planned golf
course.76 The Burnetts also were awarded damages for the
profits they would have recognized if they had been able to
develop their property.76 6 The supreme court held these profit
projections were too speculative, and therefore "the Burnetts are
not entitled to compensation for lost profits as a matter of law. 7 67
756. 860 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1993).
757. Id. at 1240.
758. Id. at 1235-36.
759. Id. at 1237-38.
760. Id. at 1240.
761. Id. at 1240-41 (emphasis added).
762. Id. at 1241.
763. Id. at 1241-42.
764. Id. at 1242.
765. Id. at 1242-43.
766. Id. at 1244.
767. Id.
YEAR IN REVIEW
B. Miscellaneous
In Mogg v. National Bank of Alaska,768 the court held that
res judicata did not bar the junior lienholder's contract, tort and
punitive damages counterclaims on remand of a foreclosure
action. 769  Because the judgment in the original trial dealt only
with the validity of a dragnet clause,' 0 the supreme court deter-mined all issues were not litigated to finality and therefore res
judicata did not apply."1 In so holding, the court adopted the
Florida rationale that "'[tihe law-of-the-case doctrine was meant to
apply to matters litigated to finality, not matters that remain
essentially unresolved due to the erroneous ruling of a lower
court.,, ,772
The court further reasoned that the superior court had not
abused its discretion by granting a motion to amend a complaint
with counterclaims since occurrences during the appeal made
remedies sought no longer available. 3 The court also held that
under Civil Rule 15(c), the junior lienholder's amendment of
counterclaims related back to the original answer filed by the
lienholder.7 Finally, the court held the junior lienholder made
a prima facie showing of fraud, causing the abrogation of the
creditor bank's attorney-client privilege by demonstrating the bank
agreed to hold a worthless deed of trust for the junior lienhold-
er.
775
Vinson v. Hamilton"6 held that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Vinson's motion for a continuance in a
forcible entry and detainer proceeding on the ground that Vinson
could put forth no defense of retaliatory eviction as a month-to-
month tenant.7 77  The court maintained that any other result
would frustrate public policy, as tenants would be afraid to assert
their rights for fear of eviction.7 8
768. 846 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1993).
769. Id. at 810.
770. Lundgren v. Nat'l Bank of Alaska, 756 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1987).
771. Mogg, 846 P.2d at 811.
772. Id. at 810 (quoting Wells Fargo v. Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency, 575
So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1991)).
773. Id. at 812.
774. Id. at 814.
775. Id. at 814-15.
776. 854 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1993).
777. Id. at 736 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§,34.03.31(a), (b) (1990)).
778. Id.
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The court also found Vinson's claim that the lease was for one
year, not month-to-month, to be a valid defense."9  The court
noted that Vinson had shown good faith through his willingness to
post an undertaking as required by Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure
85,7  and that he had acted diligently in his efforts to obtain
assistance of counsel and to prepare for trial."' Therefore, the
supreme court held that the district court abused its discretion in
denying Vinson a continuance.7"
In addressing the issue of Vinson's right to a jury trial, the
court held that there is no right to a jury trial when a party seeks
only equitable relief such as that sought here-an order of evic-
tion.7' Justices Rabinowitz and Compton dissented on this point.
Relying heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Pernell v. Southall Realty,78 they argued that the action involved
in Vinson had a legal, not equitable, background.7" The dissent-
ers also argued that the majority did not dispute that the action
brought by Hamilton performs the "same essential function" as an
action for ejectment.
City of Hydaburg v. Hydaburg Cooperative Ass'n7g arose
when Hydaburg Fisheries obtained and proceeded to execute a
foreclosure judgment against Hydaburg Cooperative Association
("HCA").788  The Economic Development Administration
("EDA") and the city claimed interests in the property of HCA
and attempted to block the execution and establish the superiority
779. Id.
780. A judge cannot grant a continuance of more than two days unless the
moving party provides an undertaking equal to the rent that will accrue during the
proceedings. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 85(a)(3).
781. Vinson, 854 P.2d at 736.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 738.
784. 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (holding that despite being a statutory creation, a
forcible entry and detainer action is a legal one similar to a common-law ejectment
action).
785. Vinson, 854 P.2d at 738 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
786. Id. at 739 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
787. 858 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1993).
788. Id. at 1132.
[Vol. 11:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
of their claims. 89 The lower court ruled against them for lack of
standing.
The Alaska Supreme Court held the superior court erred in
ruling the city lacked standing.79 The city possessed legal title to
the lands on which the plant stood and, upon expiration of the
lease, owned title to the plant itself,"' giving the city equitable
and legal interests in the property.792
In Hayes v. A.J. Associates, Inc.,793 Hayes, a lessee of mining
rights, staked a claim to the mineral estate upon discovering a
reservation of mineral rights to the state in the patent. A.J. Associ-
ates, the surface owner and lessor, sought ejectment. Hayes
counterclaimed to recover royalties paid under the lease, alleging
fraud. 94 The superior court granted summary judgment to A.J.
Associates, concluding that Hayes's location was void ab initio
because he failed to locate in good faith.795
The Alaska Supreme Court first rejected Hayes's argument
that he could not be prevented from using the property for mining
purposes because mining is commerce under the public trust
doctrine.796 The court reasoned that "commerce" in this sense
refers only to trade and transportation of goods over navigable
waters, not to mining.79 The court also found mining to be a
permanent depletion of non-renewable resources and therefore not
a "public use" affected by the public trust doctrine.798
The court found the lower court had erred, however, in barring
Hayes's claims because he had acted in bad faith.799 The court
reasoned the good faith doctrine should be applied only when
parties are asserting competing mineral claims, since the good faith
789. Id. The EDA had awarded a grant to the HCA to pay for the installation
of a cold storage facility in a fish processing plant. Id. at 1133. One condition of
EDA's grant was that all transfers of interest in the plant must be approved by the
EDA. Subsequently, the HCA found itself in need of more funds and was forced
to enter into a deal with Hydaburg Fisheries. The EDA refused to approve the
deal and demanded full repayment of the grant. Hydaburg Fisheries then sued to
recover its investment. Id.
790. Id. at 1135-36.
791. Id. at 1135. The lease expressly provided that "permanent buildings and
utilities on expiration, termination, or cancellation of this lease shall become the
property of the City." k at 1137.
792. Id. at 1136-37.
793. 846 P.2d 131 (Alaska 1993).
794. Id. at 131.
795. Id.
796. Id. at 133.
797. Id.
798. Id.
799. Id. at 134.
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doctrine usually is used to defeat claims of subsequent locators who
behave fraudulently." Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded the case for a more complete discussion of Hayes's rights
in light of his staking and recording the mineral claims. °1
XII. TAX LAW
In 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court dealt with a number of tax
issues. The issues ranged from calculation of interest deductions,
to fair market valuation, to taxes on pull-tab sales.
In State Department of Revenue v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,'
Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO") claimed interest deductions
on its tax returns from 1978 to 1981 for pipeline construction
expenses related to the Trans Alaska Pipeline System
("TAPS"). 3 The deductions were for debt incurred by its
subsidiary, ARCO Pipe Line Company ("APLC").' Pursuant
to Alaska Statutes section 43.21.030(a), "those portions of interest
... expense attributable to the pipeline transportation of oil in the
state" are subtracted from income from oil and gas pipeline
transportation.80 5 The Alaska Administrative Code ("AAC")
further provides that operating expenses for an oil pipeline include
"accruals to third parties.., for uncapitalized interest on capital
borrowed to acquire, construct, or enlarge the facilities of the
pipeline."' To calculate ARCO's allowable interest deduction, the
Department of Revenue ("DOR") multiplied ARCO's interest
expenses (which ARCO claimed in total) by the ratio of TAPS
assets to total ARCO assets, thus decreasing ARCO's allowable
interest deduction.8 7
The court agreed with ARCO that the use of such an appor-
tionment formula was contrary to the plain language of the
AAC.0 8 Since it was undisputed that the principal was borrowed
from a third party, and that the funds were used to require,
construct, or enlarge TAPS, ARCO was entitled to the full claimed
deduction.8 9
800. Id.
801. Id. at 135.
802. 858 P.2d 307 (Alaska 1993).
803. Id. at 308.
804. Id.
805. ALASKA STAT. § 43.21.030(a) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1982).
806. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 21.350(b)(1) (Oct. 1988). The regulation
was amended and recodified in 1985, and the amended regulation applies to the
tax years in question. Atlantic Richfield, 858 P.2d at 308 n.1.
807. Atlantic Richfield, 858 P.2d at 309.
808. Id. at 310.
809. Id.
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The court also determined that the benefit ARCO received by
internally transferring and refining price-controlled Alaska North
Slope ("ANS") oil qualified as taxable income.810 ANS oil was
unique as it was price-controlled, yet not subject to an entitlements
burden.8 ' The relevant statute read in pertinent part: "Gross
income.., shall be the gross value at the point of production of oil
or gas produced from a lease or property in the state." '812 The
court agreed with DOR that the value of the oil was not earned by
the refinery, as the refinery "merely released the value already
present in the oil." '813
The court also rejected ARCO's argument that the tax should
not be on the market value of the oil, but only on an amount equal
to the statutory ceiling price. 4 ARCO relied on the Administra-
tive Code's regulation that "in no event may the value.., exceed
the ceiling price. '  The court noted, however, that ARCO
realized income equal to the market price not the ceiling price.
Therefore, taxes to be paid by ARCO on that income should
likewise not be limited by the ceiling price. 6
In North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. Fairbanks North Star
Borough Board of Equalization,1 7 the court rejected North Star's
claim that it was not treated equally compared to other similarly
situated properties in the Fairbanks North Star Borough,18
finding there was "a reasonable basis to support the finding that
[the property in question] was isolated from the forces for which
the economic obsolescence reduction account." 19 The plaintiff
leased land from the federal government, on which it constructed
and operated housing facilities. The federal government rented this
housing from North Star, which in turn paid property tax on its
810. Id. at 311 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.21.020(b) (repealed effective Jan. 1,
1982)).
811. Id. Price control regulations set maximum prices that could be charged for
the oil at the wellhead in order to keep domestic oil acquisition costs low. Thus,
refiners of domestic oil had a competitive advantage over refiners of foreign oil.
To address this, the federal government promulgated the entitlements program,
which required a refiner who processed domestic (price-controlled) oil to pay an
entitlements penalty. Id. at 310-11.
812. ALASKA STAT. § 43.21.020(b) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1982).
813. Atlantic Richfield, 858 P.2d at 312.
814. Id. The oil was valued under Alaska Administrative Code title 15,
section 12.120, which was amended in and recodified in 1985. The original
regulation applied to the tax years in question. Id. at 308 n.2.
815. Id.
816. Id. at 313.
817. 844 P.2d 1109 (Alaska 1993).
818. Id. at 1110.
819. Id. at 1111.
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interest in the property.' The 1988 assessor refused to reduce
the replacement cost of the property by an economic obsolescence
factor" since North Star was receiving market rents and its net
operating income exceeded its adjusted replacement costs.'
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the following
factors: (1) the property enjoyed one hundred percent occupancy
from a high quality tenant (the federal government); (2) it was the
only property financed and designed specifically for its high quality
tenant; (3) since the property was devoted to military use, it would
not be subject to the effects of market forces; and (4) the property
would not have to compete in the civilian rental market and be
subject to its economic downturns (unless Congress failed to
appropriate money for the project).'
In Saunders Properties v. Municipality of Anchorage,824 the
court ruled that the one-year statutory limitation on refunding tax
overpayments does not apply to overpayments due to the munici-
pality's error. The Anchorage Municipal Assessor's Office
accidentally included in its assessment of plaintiff's land certain
property taken by the municipality for a right-of-way.w Hence,
from 1981 to 1988, the property in question was overtaxed. 6 In
1989, the Assessor's Office discovered its error and adjusted the
1989 tax assessment. 7 Subsequently, the property owner asked
for a refund of the excess taxes paid.' Pursuant to Alaska
Statutes section 29.45.500(b),' 9 the Assessor's Office agreed to
refund the 1988 overpayment, but refused to refund any over-
payments in the earlier years, citing the one-year time limit in
subsection (b).10 The Assessor's Office suggested, however, that
820. Id. at 1110.
821. The economic obsolescence factor reflects the impact of supply and
demand within the market.
822. North Star, 844 P.2d at 1110.
823. Id.
824. 846 P.2d 135 (Alaska 1993).
825. Id. at 137.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Subsection b reads as follows:
If, in payment of taxes legally imposed, a remittance by a Taxpayer
through error or otherwise exceeds the amount due, and the municipality,
on audit of the account in question, is satisfied that this is the case, the
municipality shall refund the excess to the taxpayer with interest at eight
percent from the date of payment. A claim for refund filed one year
after the due date of the tax is forever barred.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.500(b) (1992).
830. Saunders, 846 P.2d at 137.
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the Anchorage Assembly might have authority to make the refund
under subsection (c).83
The court ruled that the one-year limit should apply only to
overpayments resulting from taxpayer error and not to over-
payments due to the municipality's error. 2 According to the
court, subsection (c) gives the Assembly discretionary authority to
correct the municipality's clerical errors and refund resulting
overpayments without a limitations periodY The court also
ruled that the Assembly's decision to grant a refund was not
subject to mayoral veto because it was a quasi-judicial action.'
By refunding the earlier overpayments, the municipality incurred
a judgment debt, not an obligation that arose in the course of doing
business as a municipality. As with any adverse judgment against
the municipality, the mayor cannot veto it.835
In Dilley v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,836 the court held
that, as intangible personal property, pull-tabs 837 were not subject
to the Borough's sales tax ordinance as currently promulgated. 8
The pull-tabs operator had paid sales taxes on the net proceeds of
such sales (gross proceeds less prizes awarded), but refused to pay
sales taxes assessed on the gross proceeds.839 The operator also
argued the pull-tabs were not subject to the Borough's sales tax
ordinance as written.84
The court rejected the Borough's argument that pull-tab games
are "amusement services" subject to taxation. Rather, it found that
the sale of pull-tabs constituted a sale of intangible property, not
831. Id. Subsection c reads as follows: "The governing body may correct
manifest clerical errors at anytime." ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.500(c) (1992).
832. Saunders, 846 P.2d at 138-39.
833. Id. at 139 (reasoning that concerns of fairness outweighed the munici-
pality's interest in administrative convenience).
834. Id. at 140.
835. Id.
836. 855 P.2d 1335 (Alaska 1993).
837. Id. A "pull-tab games" is defined as:
a game of chance where a card, the face of which is covered to conceal
a number, symbol, or sets of symbols, is purchased by the participant and
where a prized is awarded for a card containing certain numbers or
symbols designated in advance and at random.
ALASKA STAT. § 05.15.210(28) (Supp. 1992).
838. Dilley, 855 P.2d at 1337. Under Ketchikan Gateway Borough's relevant
code section, a 1.5% sales tax is levied on all retail sales and services in the
Borough. KETCHIKAN GATEWAY BOROUGH, ALASKA CODE § 45.20.010. The
code defines a retail sale as "any nonexempt sale of services, rentals or tangible
personal property made to a buyer who intends to use the item purchased for his
own personal use." Id. § 45.20.005.
839. Dilley, 855 P.2d at 1336.
840. Id.
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a provision of services."4 Specifically, according to the court, a
pull-tab represented a contractual right to receive payment of prize
money upon purchase of a winning card and, as such, fell outside
the Borough's tax ordinance.' 4  The court indicated, however,
that the ordinance could be amended to cover pull-tab sales, as a
state ordinance does.843
XIII. TORT LAW
In 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court decided a wide variety of
tort issues including many in the areas of professional and strict
liability.
A. Professional Liability
Deal v. Kearney8 " addressed two major issues arising out of
a claim of negligent administration of emergency medical care. As
part of a settlement between the patient, Kearney, and the hospital,
Lutheran Hospitals & Homes Society of America, Inc. ("LHHS"),
Kearney released LHHS, Dr. Deal and other health care providers
from liability. In return, LHHS assigned to Kearney its rights to
indemnity, equitable subrogation and contribution against Dr.
Deal.sas
The supreme court first ruled that the assignment of claims was
proper. The assignment did not violate public policy against
champerty and maintenance since Kearney was not a stranger to
the litigation.' The court also accepted Kearney's argument that
the "injury" involved was not a "personal injury," but rather an in-
currence of a monetary obligation and thus not subject to the
general rule on non-assignability.'47
The court next held that immunity from liability under
Alaska's "Good Samaritan" statute cannot be invoked when there
is a pre-existing duty to provide care.s' A pre-existing duty
exists for physicians who have a particular employment duty to aid
the patient at the hospital. 49 Dr. Deal contended that he had no
such pre-existing duty since he received no compensation and was
841. Id.
842. Id. at 1337.
843. Id. at 1336 (noting that Alaska Statutes section 05.15.184 provides for a 3%
tax on gross revenues less prizes awarded).
844. 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993).
845. Id. at 1354.
846. Id. at 1355.
847. Id. at 1356.
848. Id. at 1358 (citing ALAsKA STAT. §09.65.090(a) (1990)).
849. Id.
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called in originally in an advisory capacity The "question of
expectation of compensation" does not constitute a per se rule;
rather the "essential issue is whether the individual has undertaken
a responsibility."'" Because genuine issues of fact remained, the
court upheld the denial of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Deal
and remanded the case to the lower court to determine if there was
a pre-existing duty. 2
In Pedersen v. Flannery,"3 the court held that the two-year
statute of limitations was applicable to a suit for injuries allegedly
caused by medical malpractice.' The court rejected Pedersen's
claim for breach of implied contract based on the grounds that
Pedersen failed to allege the doctors promised either a specific
result or a greater duty of care, and the non-economic nature of his
claimed injuries."
In a case of first impression, the court in Korman v. Mallin"5
addressed the scope of disclosure required by the "informed
consent" doctrine under Alaska law." The patient, Korman,
alleged she had not been informed that painful and unsightly
scarring was a potential consequence of breast reduction sur-
geryY8 The court concluded that the modem view should apply
in Alaska, holding that "the scope of disclosure required.., must
be measured by what a reasonable patient would need to know in
order to make an informed and intelligent decision about the
proposed treatment." 9
Although Dr. Mallin had provided Korman with pamphlets
and videos on the surgery, as well as detailed consent forms, the
court concluded "merely identifying a risk does not necessarily
provide a patient with the information necessary for an informed
decision."8  Instead, the doctor must explain in "lay terms the
nature and severity of the risk and the likelihood of its occur-
850. Id. at 1358-60.
851. Id. at 1358.
852. Id. at 1360-61.
853. 863 P.2d 856 (Alaska 1993).
854. Id. at 858. Under Alaska Statutes section 09.10.050, an action "upon a
contract or liability, express or implied," must be brought within six years. Under
section 09.10.070, an action "for any injury to the person ... not arising on
contract" must be brought within two years. Id. at 857.
855. Id.
856. 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1993).
857. Id. at 1146.
858. Id.
859. Id. at 1149 (citing ALASKA STAT § 09.55.556(a) (1990)).
860. Id. at 1150.
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rence."'861 Moreover, a doctor's duty of disclosure is expanded
further when a patient requests additional information.862 The
court remanded for a factual determination as to whether the
doctor's explanation "was adequate to allow a reasonable patient
to make an informed and intelligent decision whether to undergo
the procedure. ',86
In Shaw v. State Dep't of Administration,864 the court ad-
dressed two issues arising out of a legal malpractice case. The
court first held that prejudgment interest in claims of legal
malpractice in criminal cases begin to accrue when all the essential
elements of an action have occurred.' Because post-conviction
relief is an essential element of legal malpractice in criminal cases,
Shaw's cause of action did not accrue until August 15, 1986, when
his prior conviction was set aside as constitutionally defective.8
Thus, Shaw's cause of action was subject to Alaska Statutes section
09.30.070, which provides that unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties:
prejudgment interest accrues from the day process is served on
the defendant or the day the defendant received written notifica-
tion that an injury has occurred and that a claim may be brought
against the defendant for that injury, whichever is earlier. 7
The court then held the former criminal defendant's actual
innocence or guilt is relevant in a subsequent malpractice claim
against his attorney.8" The court so concluded because public
policy prevents recovery by a criminal for the consequences of his
acts-consequences including his imprisonment.8 9 The attorney
bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's guilt.' 0
Justice Compton did not find such a burden significant, and in
a lengthy dissent argued that the "burdens imposed on [a plaintiff],
coupled with the advantages given former defense attorneys,
virtually forecloses [sic] attorney malpractice suits arising out of
criminal representation."' As a consequence of the majority's
holding, plaintiffs are now required to prove that a conviction has
been set aside, that there was a duty owed, a breach of that duty,
861. Id.
862. Id. at 1150-51.
863. Id. at 1151.
864. 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993).
865. Id. at 569.
866. Id.
867. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070 (Supp. 1993) (applying to all causes of action
that accrued after June 11, 1986).
868. Shaw, 861 P.2d at 571.
869. Id. at 571-72.
870. Id. at 572.
871. Id at 574 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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causation and damages! 2  As to causation, the plaintiff must
prove that a jury would not have found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in so doing the plaintiff is limited by criminal
evidentiary rules.' In an affirmative defense, however, the
attorney need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff was "actually guilty" and can use any available
evidence as proof, including coerced confessions or confidential
communications. 4  Justice Compton concluded such a result
cannot be justified by any public policy or case law. 5
In Dep't of Natural Resources v. Transamerica Premier Ins.
Co.," the court reviewed actions arising from substantial cost
overruns during the construction of an arts education facility at Big
Delta State Historical Park. 7  Transamerica, the contractor's
surety, appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the State
on a tort action for business destruction. The State also appealed,
questioning the lower court's remand to the administrative forum
for a hearing on contract damages. 8s "
The Alaska Supreme Court first decided Transamerica's claim,
holding Transamerica had no basis on which to assert claims in
tort. 9 Transamerica claimed the State's close involvement with
the project meant it should be treated not only as an owner, but as
a design professional as well.' If so, there would exist a duty in
tort to "exercise reasonable care, or the ordinary skill of the
profession," such that a contractor could sue for economic losses
arising from professional malpractice."' The Alaska Supreme
Court rejected this theory, holding the State "did not assume a
design professional's duties simply because it reviewed the plans
before putting them out for bid or because it assigned an inspector
to the construction site."' 2
The Alaska Supreme Court also reasoned that to treat owners
as design professionals would negate the contractual allocation of
risk. Thus, even if the owner were negligent in the performance of
his duties, the "contractor's action for the owner's breach is in
872. Id. at 573 (Compton, J., dissenting).
873. Id. at 574 (Compton, J., dissenting).
874. Id. (Compton, J., dissenting).
875. Id. (Compton, J., dissenting).
876. 856 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1993).
877. Id. at 769.
878. Id. at 771-72.
879. Id. at 774.
880. Id. at 772.
881. Id. at 772.
882. Id. at 773.
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contract, not tort."' The court also refused to extend to other
types of arm's length transactions the insurance contract doctrine
of allowing breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to create a tort action.8
B. Strict Liability
In Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan,' the appellants
("PWC") asked the Alaska Supreme Court to overrule Northern
Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 6 and
declare purely economic loss to be noncompensable in a tort action
for strict products liability.' PWC based its appeal on the
United States Supreme Court's severe criticism of Northern Power
in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.'
Since the Alaska Supreme Court is not bound to follow the United
States Supreme Court on issues of state common law, however,
PWC presented several reasons why the state court should prefer
the East River rule.
The first argument, that "pure economic loss does not
implicate the safety rationale of torts," was rejected flatly by the
Alaska Supreme Court. 9 According to the court, a product is
no less dangerous simply because its failure did not reach its
"potential for harm by causing personal injury."'8° The court also
rejected PWC's second argument, that such an intermediate
position on strict liability is too indeterminate.891 The court
declared that "any gain in certainty from a per se rule is bought at
too high a price: decreased safety and consumer protection. ,8 92
The court also disagreed that East River better navigates the area
between contract and tort law, holding that a restriction of tort
remedies would further disadvantage consumers who already lack
equal bargaining power.s s
In affirming Northern Power, the court declared strict liability
in Alaska is based on the principle that contract law is concerned
883. Id.
884. Id. at 774.
885. 852 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1993).
886. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
887. Pratt & Whitney, 852 P.2d at 1175.
888. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
889. Pratt & Whitney, 852 P.2d at 1179.
890. Id. (quoting Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 834 P.2d
980, 985 (Okla. 1992) (Opala, CJ., dissenting)).
891. Id. at 1180.
892. Id. (citing Washington Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199
(Wash. 1989)).
893. Id. at 1180.
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with economic expectations while the tort doctrine of strict liability
is concerned with safety 94 Strict product liability is applicable
when a "defective product creates a situation potentially dangerous
to persons or other property . . .even though the damage is
confined to the product itself' 8 95
C. Other Causes of Action
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Avco Corp.9 6 established that, unlike
"intentional" tortfeasors, "willful and wanton" tortfeasors have a
right to contribution from the other parties involved in the
manufacture of a plane involved in a fatal crash.' 9 Borg-Warner
manufactured the airplane carburetor, which the trial court
determined to be the cause of the crash.98
The court noted that the Alaska legislature had specifically
deleted the term "wilfully or wantonly" from the uniform act from
which the controlling statutes was drawn s.8 9  Furthermore, the
court reasoned such an expansive reading of "intentional" would be
incompatible with comparative negligence principles introduced
into Alaska with the adoption of the Tort Reform Act in 1986.M
The court also ruled that the trial court properly applied
collateral estoppel principles before a final judgment was en-
tered.9 1 The lower court issued a memorandum decision, but
Borg-Warner and the pilot's estate settled before entry of judg-
ment.9" The Alaska Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
final judgment, holding "appealability is not a necessary prerequi-
site to 'finality' for the purpose of collateral estoppel." ' Rather,
the test is simply whether the issue has been "fully litigated."'
Finding this issue "fully litigated," the court held Borg-Warner was
precluded from re-litigating the nature of its conduct.' °5 The trial
court's findings of relative fault between Borg-Warner and the
894. Id. at 1177-78.
895. Id. at 1177 (quoting Northern Power, 623 P.2d at 329).
896. 850 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1993).
897. Id. at 631. Alaska Statutes section 09.16.010(c) provides: "[tihere is no
right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused or
contributed to the injury or wrongful death." ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(c)
(1983).
898. Borg-Warner, 850 P.2d at 630.
899. Id. at 633.
900. Id.
901. Id. at 634.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 635.
904. Id.
905. Id.
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joined third-parties, however, could not be considered final,
because the issue was not "properly before the court in the...
trial."90
Mulvihill v. Union Oil Co. of California ("Unocal")' arose
out of a drunk-driving accident which claimed the lives of three
people, including the intoxicated driver, Tony LeMay.1  The
plaintiffs brought suit against the social host and LeMay's employ-
er, Unocal, and Brad Frates, who drove the intoxicated Lemay
home earlier that evening.' The superior court granted summa-
ry judgment in favor of both defendants.91 °
The Alaska Supreme Court also declined to hold Unocal liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.91" The court conclud-
ed "it would be unwise and unfair to create what amounts to an
exception to [the statute] by holding employers to a different
liability standard than other social hosts." ' Because the other
respondent, Frates, agreed to drive the intoxicated LeMay home,
the court analyzed his actions as a "volunteer., 913  The court
concluded that driving LeMay home and waiting until he opened
his apartment door was sufficient to discharge Frates's duties.914
Specifically, the court concluded Frates had no additional duty of
ensuring LeMay did not drink more after arriving at home.915
The court reasoned that to impose such a duty would be poor
public policy, discouraging the practice of utilizing designated
drivers.91
D. Damages
In Hughes v. Harrelson,917 the court held that public policy
considerations compelled the court to ignore the provisions of an
insurance contract limiting prejudgment interest.918 Both the
Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act and the Mandatory Motor
906. Id. at 636.
907. 859 P.2d 1310 (Alaska 1993).
908. Id. at 1312.
909. Id.
910. Id.
911. Id.
912. Id. at 1313. Under this statute, one who does not own a liquor license
cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the intoxication of a person to
whom they served alcohol. ALAsKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1986).
913. Mulvihill, 859 P.2d at 1313.
914. Id. at 1314.
915. Id
916. Id.
917. 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993).
918. Id. at 1108.
224 [Vol. 11:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
Vehicle Insurance Act require vehicle owners to obtain liability
insurance for injuries to other parties.919 The purpose of these
statutes is to protect innocent victims of vehicle accidents from
financial loss.2 The court reasoned that this purpose would be
"subverted if the 'innocent victim' is deprived of the prejudgment
benefits of an award."9''
Grow v. Ruggles arose out of a car accident in which Grow
was found to be entirely at fault.' In a special verdict, the jury
awarded Ruggles the exact amount of medical expenses she
requested and monetary damages for past and future income.'
They did not award her anything for pain, suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life, however, and Ruggles filed a motion for a new
trial, which was denied.'
The court agreed with Grow that Ruggles waived her right to
complain about the verdict's consistency by failing to resubmit the
issue to the jury before the jury was discharged.26  The court
rejected Ruggles's argument that the waiver rule was inapplicable
because the jury was polled following the verdict.27 According
to the court, polling only clarifies the vote of each individual juror;
it does not require each juror to re-examine the issues.' Since
the waiver rule is designed to promote efficiency and preclude jury
919. Alaska Statutes section 28.20.440(b) reads in relevant part:
(b) The owner's policy of liability insurance must...
(2) insure the person named ... against loss from liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of the vehicle. . ., subject to limits exclu-
sive of interests and costs, with respect to each vehicle, as
follows: $50,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident....
ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(b) (1989).
Alaska Statutes section 28.22.101(d) reads in relevant part:
(d) A motor vehicle liability policy must provide coverage in the United
States or Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with
respect to each vehicle, as follows:
(1) $50,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person
in one accident ....
ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.101(d) (1989).
920. Hughes, 844 P.2d at 1107.
921. Id.
922. 860 P.2d 1225 (Alaska 1993).
923. Id. at 1226.
924. Id.
925. Id.
926. Id.
927. Id. at 1227.
928. Id.
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shopping, a litigant must ask the jurors to re-examine their decision.
David S. Hagy
Gary Kenneth Milligan
James Benjamin Trachtman
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